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The Constitution and the Consequences of
the Social History of Racism
Robert A. Sedler*
INTRODUCTION
The twenty years that Justice Thurgood Marshall has
served on the Supreme Court have seen a significant change in
the nature of constitutional questions that arise in the area of
racial equality. The constitutional questions in this area for
the most part no longer involve the traditional forms of gov-
ernmental discrimination disadvantaging blacks and other ra-
cial minorities. I Rather, the crucial constitutional issue in the
area of racial equality today is whether the Constitution re-
quires or permits governmental entities to take account of the
consequences of the long and tragic social history of racism in
this nation that have created a condition of societal racial
inequality.
The term "social history of racism" is a convenient way
of summarizing the history of discrimination and victimiza-
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, J.D., 1959, University
of Pittsburgh. Valuable assistance in the preparation of this article was provided by Ms.
W. Ann Warner, a third-year student at Wayne State University Law School.
1. Following its seminal decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), the Court rendered a large number of decisions in the 1960's invalidating state-
imposed racial segregation and discrimination. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969) (municipal charter provision subjecting fair housing laws to referendum pro-
cedure); Loving v. 'Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (prohibition of interracial marriage);
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (state constitutional provision prohibiting the
enactment of fair housing laws); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (use of
voter qualification tests to disenfranchise blacks); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964) (prohibition of interracial cohabitation); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399
(1964) (designation of race of candidate on election ballot); Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (operation of segregated restaurant by private party in
publicly-owned facility); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (redrawing munic-
ipal boundaries so as to exclude all black residents).
Such cases continue to arise sporadically, but they are increasingly rare. See Bat-
son v. Kentucky, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986) (use of preemptory challenges by
prosecutor to exclude black jurors on racial grounds); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984) (denial of child custody to a white mother because her new husband was black).
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tion of blacks in American society.2 This history has become
saddeningly familiar and was traced fully by Justice Marshall
in his opinion in Bakke.3 The social history of racism was
originally the aftermath of slavery, and like slavery, it was
predicated and justified on the supposed moral inferiority of
the black race.4 It is the history of an official status of inferi-
ority established by law; of rampant discrimination in employ-
ment; of ghettoization; of segregated and tangibly inadequate
schooling; and of the denial of access to societal power. Ra-
cial discrimination was often commanded by the government
at all levels, and when it was not commanded, it was tolerated
and encouraged. Private entities and individuals added their
significant contributions to this pattern of racism. Indeed,
only in the last three decades has any real progress been made
in halting much of the overt discrimination practiced against
blacks in the United States.
The consequences of this long and tragic history of ra-
cism remain and perpetuate themselves. It is not necessary to
review at length the all too familiar and depressing manifesta-
tions of the condition of societal racial inequality that exists in
the United States today. There is an enormous "economic
gap" between blacks and whites, with blacks suffering dispro-
2. The focus of this writing is on the social history of racism as it has been di-
rected against blacks, and the present-day consequences of that history. Racism has
also produced adverse effects on other racial-ethnic groups, such as Hispanics and Na-
tive-Americans, who, like blacks, have been subject to discrimination and victimization
because the dominant white majority has perceived them as being "non-white." See,
e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1973) (segregation of
Hispanics in the public schools). The propositions for which the author is contending in
the present writing are equally applicable to laws and governmental actions affecting
these racial-ethnic groups. On the other hand, while Asian-Americans have also been
subject to discrimination and victimization in the past, the consequences of this past
discrimination have not been as great; Asian-Americans as a group do not suffer "ine-
quality" in relation to whites in most important aspects of American life. For a discus-
sion of this point, see Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 120 (1979).
3. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 390-96 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
4. As Professor Perry has observed: "The material inequality of the races is the
objective, concrete manifestation of the widespread belief in the moral inequality of the
races and of racially discriminatory practices reflecting that belief." Perry, Modern
Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1040
(1979).
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portionate unemployment and underemployment, being con-
centrated in the low-paying and low-prestige occupations, and
having a family income little more than half that of whites.'
5. The black unemployment rate has been consistently twice that of whites. As
of December, 1984, the black unemployment rate stood at 14.4%, compared with a
white unemployment rate of 6.0%. U.S. DEPT. LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, table A-6, Jan., 1985. In 1982, the black unem-
ployment rate was 18.9%, compared to 8.6% for whites. U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AMERICA'S BLACK POPULATION: 1970-1982, chart 5
(1983). Among black teenagers in 1982, the unemployment rate reached 48%, com-
pared to 20.4% for white teenagers. Id.
A disproportionate number of blacks who are employed are found in the lower-
paying, lower-prestige occupational categories; working blacks are underrepresented in
the more elite and "white collar" jobs. Even within the "blue collar" category, where
the distribution of blacks and whites is more even, blacks are disproportionately concen-
trated in the least desirable occupations. See generally U.S. COMM'N CIVIL RIGHTS,
SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN (1978). See also
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, supra, at table A-23; AMERICA'S BLACK POPULATION,
supra, at table 3.
The end result is that black family income is little more than half of white family
income, a figure that has remained constant for a long time. In 1983, median black
family income was $12,429, compared to median white family income of $21,902.
Black income was approximately 57% of white income. In 1967, median black family
income was $4325, compared to median white family income of $7449. Black income
was approximately 58% of white income. U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, BUREU OF THE
CENSUS, 1985 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, table 735. In 1981,
34% of black families lived below the federally-defined poverty level ($9287 for a family
of four), compared to 11% of white families. AMERICA'S BLACK POPULATION, supra,
at chart 4.
The racial difference in median family income is only due to some extent to the fact
that a much higher proportion of black families than white families are headed by wo-
men. (As of 1982, 41% compared to 12%. AMERICA'S BLACK POPULATION, supra, at
chart 7). Among families headed by females, black families had a median income of
$7510, compared with $12,510 for white families; black income in this situation was
60% of white income. Id. at chart 2. Among families where the father was the only
wage-earner, the median income for black families was $14,420, compared with $23,460
for white families, or 61% of white income. U.S. DEPT. LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, FAMILIES AT WORK: THE JOBS AND THE PAY, table 4, August, 1984.
Twenty-four point four percent of such black families live below the poverty level, com-
pared with 9% of such white families. The income gap is generally smaller among
married couples with the median black family income as of 1981 at $19,620, compared
with $25,470 for white families. Among this group, black income is 76% of white in-
come. AMERICA'S BLACK POPULATION, supra, at chart 2. But even among these two
person families, as of 1982, 15.6% of the black families lived below the poverty level,
compared with 6.9% of white families. FAMILIES AT WORK, supra, at table 4. It is
only in these families, where both spouses are employed, that the gap is narrowed con-
siderably, since white working wives in such families do not earn very much more than
black working wives. In 1982, the median income of working couple black families was
$26,110, compared with $29,650 for working couple white families; black income was
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There is likewise a racial "educational gap," with blacks con-
tinuing to lag significantly behind whites in terms of academic
achievement and quality of educational experience.6 Above
all, there is the racial "power gap." Blacks are seriously un-
88% of white income. Id. What the data indicates then is that the racial difference in
median family income would still be quite substantial if the proportion of black families
headed by women was the same as the proportion of white families headed by women.
The racial income gap is worsened, because proportionately more black families than
white families are headed by females.
There appears to be little prospect that the condition of racial economic inequality
will improve in the foreseeable future, and it may even be worsening. For example, as
the black population of the nation's central cities increases, the availability of manufac-
turing jobs and other jobs requiring minimal levels of skill has declined in these areas.
Employment opportunities in the central cities have been primarily in information
processing and other white collar areas, which require higher levels of skill and educa-
tion. See New Jobs in Cities Little Aid to Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1986, at 1. In the
nation's 50 largest cities, the percentage of black families living in poverty has increased
from 1970 to 1980, and in aggregate terms, the number of blacks living in poverty in
those cities exceeds the number of whites. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of
blacks living in poverty increased from 2.6 million to 3.1 million, while the number of
whites declined from 3.2 million to 2.6 million. See Poverty of Blacks Spreads in Cities,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1987, at 1.
6. Regarding the level of education attained, in 1983, 43.2% of blacks, compared
with 27.9% of the general population, had not completed high school. Among persons
25-29 years old, the rate was 20.6% for blacks, compared with 14.0% for the general
population. U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1985 STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, table 213. As of that year, 19.5% of all whites had
graduated from college, compared with 9.5% of all blacks. Id. at table 214. A 1977
study by the United States Office of Education found that only 58% of black seventeen-
year-olds were functionally literate, compared with 87% of white seventeen-year-olds.
U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., INEQUALITIES IN THE EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF
BLACK AND WHITE AMERICANS 8-9 (1977). According to the United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights in 1978, by the time black males reached high school, they were
likely to be two or more grades behind in school. SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 5, at
table 2.1.
A recent study by the Rand Corporation found that black students "are dispropor-
tionately more likely to be enrolled in special education programs, and are less likely to
be enrolled in programs for the gifted and talented," and are "underrepresented in aca-
demic programs and overrepresented in vocational-educational programs." The study
concludes that, "Overall, the evidence suggests that black students are exposed to less
challenging educational program offerings, which are less likely to enhance the develop-
ment of higher cognitive skills and abilities than white students." Gains by Blacks in
Education Found Eroding, The Chron. of Higher Educ., Apr. 17, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
The disparity in educational quality carries over into higher education, where
blacks are more likely than whites to attend poorly-rated schools. The Rand study
found that black students were enrolling in increasing proportions at two-year institu-
tions where drop-out rates, especially for blacks, are higher than at four-year colleges,
and where fewer resources are available in the most important areas of educational
programming. In colleges, as well as in secondary schools, the Report concluded that
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derrepresented in positions of societal power, in the "elite"
professions, and in the "economic mainstream." '7 Still another
consequence of the social history of racism is residential racial
segregation and concentration. The black population is con-
centrated within the central cities of the nation's largest met-
ropolitan areas, where they generally live in racial isolation
from both urban and suburban whites. In short, in the
black students on the average "receive educational programs and offerings that differ in
kind and content from those of white students." Id.
7. For example, although blacks comprise 12% of the population of the United
States, blacks represent only 2.6% of the lawyers and judges in the country, 5% of the
physicians, 3.2% of the editors and reporters, and 4.7% of the college and university
teachers. 1985 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at table
22. The absence of blacks in the top management of America's corporations needs no
documentation. Blacks are equally underrepresented in the highest levels of the govern-
mental bureaucracy and educational institutions.
There are relatively few black-owned business enterprises, and such enterprises
generate an insignificant amount of the total business volume. As of 1976, for example,
only 3% of the 13 million business enterprises in the United States were owned by
blacks and other minorities, and of the 2.54 trillion dollars in gross business receipts
that year, only about 16.6 billion dollars, or 0.65% of the total, were realized by minor-
ity-owned businesses. 122 CONG. REC. 13866 (daily ed. May 13, 1976) (Statement of
Senator Javits); 122 CONG. REC. 3574 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (Statement of Senator
Glenn). In 1984, the largest black-owned business, Johnson Publishing, had sales of
only 138.9 million dollars. As the president of one black-owned company observed:
"Our figures are not that significant. When you put all of the top 100 black companies'
sales together they might equal one of the companies on the bottom of the Fortune 500
list." Black-Owned Companies Gain, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1985, at D5, col. 2.
8. For a summary of the extent of residential racial segregation and concentra-
tion, based on 1980 census data, see Farley, Assessing Black Progress.- Voting & Citizen-
ship Rights, Residency & Housing, Education, 13 ECONOMIC OUTLOOK USA 16 (1986).
The author concludes:
In areas which have large black populations, there are many central city
neighborhoods and a few in the suburbs which are either all-black or well
along to becoming exclusively black enclaves. Most other neighborhoods have
no more than token black populations. Studies of residential patterns in 1980
revealed that blacks are very different from other minority or ethnic groups in
this respect. In particular, they are much more segregated from whites than
are two more newly arrived groups: Asians and Hispanics.
Id. at 17.
The index of dissimilarity is used to measure the extent of residential racial segre-
gation. If there were perfect residential racial integration, the index would be 0; if there
was complete residential racial segregation, it would be 100. According to 1980 census
data, the index of dissimilarity for the nation's metropolitan areas of 2.5 million or more
was as follows: New York-81; Los Angeles-Long Beach-8 1; Chicago-88; Philadel-
phia-79; Detroit-88; San Francisco-Oakland-72; Washington, D.C.-70; Dallas-
Fort Worth-79; Houston-75; Boston-77; Nassau-Suffolk (Long Island)-77. Id. at
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United States today, we still have "two societies, black and
white, separate and unequal."9
Until Justice Marshall came on the Court, and for some
period thereafter, the struggle for racial equality concentrated
almost entirely on attacking the existing structural impedi-
ments that denied equality to blacks. This struggle has been
largely successful in the sense that the Constitution has been
interpreted to prohibit state-imposed segregation and other
traditional forms of intentional governmental discrimination
against blacks."0 Federal laws now prohibit racial discrimina-
tion in voting, employment, public accommodations, and
housing. Similar protection is afforded by the laws of many
states. This means that there is now in place a system of pre-
vention; the law prohibits present discrimination against
blacks by the government" and many private entities, and
provides remedies for such discrimination.
The system of prevention, however, does not purport to
deal directly with the present consequences of the social his-
tory of racism; nor is it designed to do so. Because these con-
sequences are so pervasive, self-perpetuating, and self-
reinforcing, 12 the system of prevention, even if vigorously and
9. REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
10. The Court's constitutional doctrine in regard to racial equality has developed
with reference to the concept of invidious racial discrimination. All the traditional
forms of intentional governmental discrimination against blacks have been found to be
"invidious" and hence unconstitutional, because in no case could they be shown to be
"[n]ecessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of
the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to elim-
inate." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
11. Subject to the requirement of a showing of discriminatory intent, as will be
discussed subsequently.
12. The self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing nature of those consequences is illus-
trated by considering the relationship between the "economic gap" and the "educa-
tional gap." Because of the "economic gap," black children are disproportionately
lower-income in relation to white children, and, for this reason, are likely to have a
substantially lower level of academic achievement. This is aggravated by the fact that
the majority of black children will have received all or part of their education in
predominantly black and thus predominantly lower-income schools. See generally Sed-
ler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles and
Winning Small Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 535, 548-50.
Low educational attainment, caused in large part by economically disadvantaged status
and attendance at schools in which economically disadvantaged children predominate,
in turn has a severe detrimental impact when the children become adults on their eco-
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fully enforced, will do relatively little to alter the societally
disadvantaged and subordinate position of blacks.
This brings us to the relationship between racially neutral
action and the! consequences of the social history of racism.
Racially neutral action means action that is based on criteria
of selection that plausibly serve functions other than racial se-
lection, 13 and that cannot be shown to have been undertaken
with an intent to discriminate on the basis of race under the
current constitutional standard. 14 Frequently, racially neutral
action will interact with the consequences of the social history
of racism to produce what may properly be called a racially
discriminatory effect. The effect of the racially neutral action
will be to disadvantage blacks or otherwise perpetuate the con-
sequences of the social history of racism. In other words, the
racially neutral action will have an effect because of race, and
will result in the continuation of racial inequality and racial
separation.
There are many examples of this phenomenon. The au-
thor will only cite a few at this juncture. Because of massive
residential racial segregation and concentration, the use of ge-
ographic attendance zoning within a school district will pro-
duce a large number of racially identifiable schools,' 5 and the
establishment of school districts on urban-suburban lines will
frequently produce a predominantly black urban district, sur-
rounded by virtually all-white suburban districts.16 Similarly,
the refusal of a white suburb to permit the construction of
low-income or public housing, which would be operated on a
racially integrated basis, prevents racial integration in the sub-
urb. 17 And, if the same suburb requires that applicants for
nomic status, social mobility, and other indicia of social well-being. Thus, poorly edu-
cated black children grow into adults in low-status, low-paying jobs, and their depressed
economic condition adversely affects the educational opportunities of their children.
The cycle of poverty and inequality is then perpetuated from one generation to another.
13. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 540, 554 (1977).
14. See infra notes 30-52 and accompanying text.
15. See Sedler, The Constitution and School Desegregation: An Inquiry into the
Nature of the Substantive Right, 68 Ky. L.J. 879, 919-22 (1979).
16. Id.
17. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. See also United States v. City of
Birmingham, 727 F.2d 560 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984) (virtually all-
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public employment be residents of the suburb at the time the
application is made, no blacks will be able to obtain public
employment within that suburb.18
The extreme "educational gap" between blacks as a
group and whites as a group means that whenever eligibility
for any position or benefit, such as a job or admission to pro-
fessional school, depends on comparative test scores or other
objective indicators of academic achievement, blacks will be
disproportionately excluded in comparison to whites. 19 There-
fore, even though there may be no present intent to discrimi-
nate against blacks, and even though the particular test or
academic qualification may be "valid" for the purposes for
which it is being used,2° the effect of its use will be to exclude
blacks disproportionately in comparison to whites.
As these examples indicate, in today's society racially
neutral action will frequently have an effect because of race.
The effect of such action will be to disadvantage blacks or
otherwise perpetuate the present consequences of the social
history of racism. The constitutional issue regarding the sig-
nificance of this racially discriminatory effect is two-fold.
First, to what extent is the government required to take ac-
count of the racially discriminatory effect of otherwise racially
neutral action, so that the failure to do so may render such
action unconstitutional. Second, to what extent may the gov-
ernment, consistent with the Constitution, affirmatively em-
ploy race-conscious rather than race-neutral criteria in
governmental programs and operations for the purpose of
benefiting blacks and alleviating the racially discriminatory ef-
fect that would result from adherence to race-neutral criteria.
The primary focus of this article will be on how the
Supreme Court has dealt with this crucial issue of racial
equality. This analysis will reveal that under the Court's cur-
white suburb was found to have blocked the construction of proposed low-income se-
nior citizen and family housing project, because the project would be operated on a
racially integrated basis).
18. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
19. See Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the Constitution: Bakke v. Regents
of the University of California, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 345-55 (1977).
20. For a discussion of the "validation" of employment testing, see Ensley Branch
of NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 816-18 (5th Cir. 1980).
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rent constitutional doctrine the government generally is not
required to take account of the foreseeable racially discrimina-
tory effect of racially neutral action. It is only when the ra-
cially discriminatory effect of governmental action can be
traced to identified past intentional discrimination on the part
of that governmental entity that such effect will be held to be
unconstitutional. Absent a showing of this "line of causa-
tion," a governmental entity has no constitutional responsibil-
ity to take account of the foreseeable racially discriminatory
effect of its actions. The analysis will also reveal that the af-
firmative use of race-conscious criteria benefiting blacks in
governmental programs and operations is most likely to be
sustained where it is directly related to overcoming the pres-
ent consequences of identified past intentional discrimination
on the part of the entity employing the race-conscious criteria.
In other words, under the Court's current constitutional
doctrine, the present consequences of the social history of ra-
cism are of limited significance in determining the constitu-
tional validity of governmental action affecting blacks and
other racial minorities. Rather, in the area of racial equality,
the Court's emphasis has been on intentional governmental
discrimination, past or present, and absent a showing of such
discrimination, the government is not required to, and at least
in some circumstances may not be permitted to, take account
of those consequences. Because those consequences are so
pervasive and self-reinforcing, the Court's current constitu-
tional doctrine: in this area stands as an obstacle to achieving
what Justice Marshall has called "genuine equality" between
blacks and whites in American society.21
The first section of the article will discuss the Court's
current approach to the matter of "discriminatory intent" and
"discriminatory effect." This discussion will reveal that, as a
general proposition, governmental action having a racially
discriminatory effect or otherwise perpetuating the present
consequences of the social history of racism is not unconstitu-
tional. It is only when it can be demonstrated that the chal-
lenged action was undertaken with discriminatory intent on
21. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 398 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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the part of the governmental decision-maker or directly per-
petuates the present consequences of identified past inten-
tional discrimination on the part of that governmental entity
that it rises to the level of a constitutional violation. It is the
author's position that in light of the values embodied in the
fourteenth amendment and the Reconstruction amendments,
taken as a whole, governmental action having a foreseeable
racially discriminatory effect should be subject to a substantial
burden of justification, and unless that burden can be sus-
tained, the action should be held unconstitutional. Crucial to
this position is a distinction between governmental action hav-
ing what the Court has referred to as a "racially dispropor-
tionate impact" 22 and governmental action having what may
be called a racially discriminatory effect, as the author will
define that concept. The contention will be that the burden of
justification applies to governmental action that has a racially
discriminatory effect, which, under the author's definition of
that concept, relates the effect of the governmental action to
the present consequences of the social history of racism.
The second section of the article will discuss the limited
circumstances in which the Court will find racial discrimina-
tion unconstitutional absent a showing of present discrimina-
tory intent. The third section of the article will explicate
further the author's view of the meaning of racially discrimi-
natory effect and will apply that concept to a number of situa-
tions that the Court has dealt with under the discriminatory
intent standard. In the fourth section of the article there will
be a discussion of the constitutional permissibility of the use of
race-conscious criteria benefiting blacks and other racial mi-
norities23 in governmental programs and operations. The
analysis will reveal that under the Court's current doctrine,
the use of race-conscious criteria is constitutionally permissi-
ble when undertaken for the purpose of remedying identified
22. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
23. Because the social history of racism has also had an adverse effect on other
racial-ethnic groups, such as Hispanics and Native-Americans, see supra note 2, and
since these groups have been subject to discrimination and victimization on the same
basis as blacks, it should be constitutionally permissible for a legislative body to include
them in any racial preference given to blacks. For a discussion on the matter of inclu-
sion in the preference, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 n.35 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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past unlawful discrimination on the part of the governmental
entity employing such criteria. 24 There will also be a discus-
sion of the other purposes for which the use of race-conscious
criteria may be permissible. Since the author's views as to the
constitutional permissibility of the use of race-conscious crite-
ria to overcome the present consequences of the social history
of racism and to achieve what he has-called the equal partici-
pation objective have been fully explicated elsewhere, they will
only be summarized briefly here. In the concluding section of
the article, the author will develop his thesis with respect to
the constitutional significance of the present consequences of
the social history of racism. The thesis will be developed with
reference to the black freedom value, which the author will
demonstrate is embodied in the fourteenth amendment and
the Reconstruction amendments, taken as a whole. The thesis
is two-fold. First, in light of the black freedom value, the ap-
propriate constitutional standard to determine the validity of
governmental action adversely affecting blacks should be ra-
cially discriminatory effect, as the author defines that concept,
rather than racially discriminatory intent. Second, again in
light of this constitutional value, the affirmative use of race-
conscious criteria benefiting blacks in governmental programs
and operations, designed to achieve what the author refers to
as the equal participation objective, is fully constitutional.
Under the author's thesis, therefore, the Constitution should
be interpreted as both requiring and permitting governmental
entities to take account of the consequences of the social his-




Under the Supreme Court's current constitutional doc-
trine, racially neutral governmental action does not constitute
impermissible racial discrimination, regardless of the foresee-
able effect of such action on blacks or other racial minorities,
unless that action can be shown to have been undertaken with
24. See infra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
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"discriminatory intent."25 The discriminatory intent require-
ment first surfaced in cases involving school segregation in
states where segregation was not required by state law at the
time of Brown v. Board of Education.26 The Court held that
the existence of a large number of racially identifiable schools
in school districts located in such states was unconstitutional
only if it was de jure, that is, if it was brought about by inten-
tional segregative actions on the part of school authorities. 7
As a result of the concept of de jure segregation, school chil-
dren have no constitutional right to attend racially integrated
schools, even if the integration of the schools in a school dis-
trict would be fully feasible. As the author has discussed
more fully elsewhere,28 the nature of the substantive right is to
attend school in a school system in which there presently exist
no vestiges of state-imposed segregation. 9 This being so,
where intentional segregative actions on the part of school au-
25. See supra note 10. The Court's constitutional doctrine in regard to racial
equality has developed with reference to the concept of invidious racial discrimination.
Invidious racial discrimination may be defined operationally as the unjustifiable use of
race-conscious criteria in laws or governmental action that disadvantages people be-
cause of their race. Where the use of race-conscious criteria is contained in an express
racial classification such use is subject to "strict scrutiny" and will be held unconstitu-
tional unless (1) it is "justified by a compelling governmental interest," and (2) the
particular use of race-conscious criteria is "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
goal." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1846 (1986) (Opin-
ion of Powell, J.). Likewise, where it can be shown that purportedly neutral laws have
been administered in a racially-discriminatory manner, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886), or that particular governmental action was undertaken with the intention to
discriminate on the basis of race, Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), there is
invidious racial discrimination for constitutional purposes. In this circumstance, since
the government purportedly was not using race-conscious criteria, it is unlikely that the
government will be able to proffer any justification for the resulting racial discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). The discriminatory intent
requirement is applicable to all constitutional challenges to discrimination on the basis
of identifiable group membership, such as gender. See Personnel Admin'r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. See Sedler, supra note 15, at 893-97. It is clear in retrospect that the Court
was trying to develop a doctrine that would assimilate for constitutional purposes the
situation existing in states where segregation was required by state law at the time of
Brown and the situation where it was not. The unifying element in the assimilative
process has been the concept of de jure segregation.
28. Sedler, supra note 15, at 916-26.
29. For a discussion of the affirmative duty on the part of the school authorities to
eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation and the constitutional consequences
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thorities cannot be shown, the school district does not violate
the Constitution by operating a large number of racially iden-
tifiable schools.
The leading case imposing the discriminatory intent re-
quirement as a matter of general equal protection doctrine is
Washington v. Davis. 30 In retrospect, it is difficult to imagine a
less favorable -factual situation in which to assert that the stan-
dard for an equal protection violation should be racially dis-
criminatory effect rather than racially discriminatory intent.
The plaintiffs in that case were trying to transfer wholesale the
test for establishing a Title VII violation to the constitutional
arena, 3' and the Court was not willing to make this "quantum
leap." Writing for the Court, Justice White stated: "We have
never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating
claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the
standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so
today. ' 32 Moreover, the plaintiffs in that case were challeng-
ing as unconstitutional a qualifying test for police employment
that well may not have been violative of Title VII, 33 and they
were doing so in the context of a governmental body's volun-
tary affirmative action program that had substantially in-
creased the number of black officers on the police force.34 To
say the least, the Court could not be expected to be sympa-
thetic to the substance of the plaintiffs' claim. In the process
of rejecting that claim, the Court imposed the discriminatory
intent requirement as a matter of general equal protection
resulting from the failure to satisfy that duty, see infra notes 65-81 and accompanying
text.
30. 426 U.S. 22.9 (1976).
31. Under Title VII, purportedly neutral employment practices that have a ra-
cially disproportionate impact on racial minorities or other protected groups constitute
"discrimination," and are invalid unless they can be justified by "business necessity."
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
32. 426 U.S. at 239.
33. The Court indicated that the qualifying test would not be violative of Title VII,
because it was directly related to the requirements of the police training program. In
any event, by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the training program had
undergone substantial modifications. The Court refused to remand the case to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings with respect to the Title VII claim. Id. at 248-52.
34. Id. at 235. [n the nine months preceding the filing of the lawsuit, 44% of the
new police force recruits had been black.
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doctrine.3"
In this regard, the Court stated:
The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official
conduct discriminating on the basis of race .... [O]ur
cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a
racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.3
6
The Court went on to focus on the matter of racially dispro-
portionate impact, in the sense of a law or governmental ac-
tion affecting proportionately more blacks than whites.
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serv-
ing ends otherwise within the power of government to
pursue is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause sim-
ply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race
than of another. Disproportionate impact is not irrele-
vant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.37
In other words, it appears that the Court in Washington v.
Davis saw the constitutional choice as being between a stan-
dard of racially discriminatory intent or a standard of racially
disproportionate impact, and came down on the side of ra-
cially discriminatory intent.
The reason the Court did so was explicitly stated by Jus-
tice White:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is
nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in
practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another
would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, wel-
fare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average
black than to the more affluent white.38
35. See also Personnel Admin'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
36. Washington, 426 U.S. at 239.
37. Id. at 242.
38. Id. at 248 (emphasis added). In commenting on this reason for the imposition
of the discriminatory intent requirement, Professor Bennett has observed: "The Court's
emphasis on motivation, subjectively understood, has not been affirmatively justified by
reference to any theoretical understanding of equal protection. The Court's only real
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One of the most enduring consequences of the social history of
racism is the! "economic gap" between blacks and whites.
Since blacks as a group are disproportionately poor in com-
parison to whites as a group, it would follow that a constitu-
tional standard requiring disproportionate impact analysis
could have the far-reaching implications suggested by Justice
White. That is, governmental action adversely affecting poor
persons, such as a requirement that indigent litigants pay fil-
ing fees, which has generally been upheld against equal pro-
tection challenges,39 would now be subject to a claim of
unconstitutional racial discrimination and have to be evalu-
ated under the more exacting compelling governmental inter-
est standard of review. The Court has strongly resisted any
effort to require more exacting scrutiny of governmental ac-
tion adversely affecting poor persons," and likewise has re-
fused to equate discrimination on the basis of poverty with
discrimination on the basis of race, so as to bring into play
more exacting scrutiny "by the back door."4 Thus, the
Court's preoccupation with the implications of disproportion-
ate impact analysis in Washington v. Davis is understandable,
and it may be that in order to avoid having to deal with those
implications, the Court held that the constitutional standard
for claims of racial discrimination resulting from the applica-
tion of facially neutral laws is that of discriminatory intent.
There is, however, a middle ground that the Court appar-
ently did not consider in Washington v. Davis. It is possible to
distinguish between governmental action having a racially dis-
stab at justification has been to point to problems with the presumed alternative of an
effects-based test." Bennett, Reflections on the Role of Motivation Under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1009, 1009-10 (1984-85).
39. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (Bankruptcy Act's conditioning the
right to discharge on payment of $50 fee does not violate "equal protection" component
of fifth amendment's due process clause). It is only where the civil action involves "fun-
damental rights," such as divorce or paternity, that the Constitution requires the gov-
ernment to take account of the poverty of the indigent litigant. See Little v. Streeter,
452 U.S. 1 (1981); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
40. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (system
of school financing based on property wealth); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)
(referendum approval of public housing projects); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970) (classifications contained in welfare legislation).
41. See, e.g., James, 402 U.S. at 141.
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proportionate impact and governmental action having a ra-
cially discriminatory effect. As illustrated by the nature of the
plaintiffs' claim in Washington v. Davis, and by disproportion-
ate impact analysis in Title VII cases,4 2 racially disproportion-
ate impact is essentially a matter of racial numbers. The
inquiry focuses on whether proportionately more blacks than
whites are adversely affected by the challenged action. Thus,
if an employment qualification test or any other employment
requirement disqualifies proportionately more blacks than it
does whites, the use of that test or requirement to determine
eligibility for employment is violative of Title VII, unless it
can be shown to be justified by "business necessity. '4 3 Simi-
larly, as pointed out above, laws or governmental action ad-
versely affecting poor persons will affect proportionately more
blacks than whites.
However, while disproportionate racial poverty is indeed
a major consequence of the social history of racism, poverty is
not a distinctly racial characteristic. Large numbers of whites
are also poor, and in the aggregate, there are many more poor
whites than there are poor blacks. 44 Racially discriminatory
effect, as the author defines that concept, does not look to ra-
cial numbers. Rather, it looks to the consequences of the so-
cial history of racism and to the specific racial effects
manifesting those consequences. The inquiry focuses on
whether the racially neutral action will have an effect because
of race, and will result in the continuation of the racial ine-
quality and racial separation that are directly traceable to the
42. Disproportionate impact analysis is required in Title VII cases because the
purpose of Title VII was to bring about the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnec-
essary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
43. In regard to the matter of "discriminatory intent" in a Title VII case, the
Court in Griggs stated as follows:
[blut good intent or the absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capabil-
ity....
[C]ongress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employ-
ment practices, not simply the motivation. More than that, Congress has
placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question. Id. at 432.
44. See Sedler, supra note 19, at 343-44.
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social history of racism. The author has previously given a
number of examples of the phenomenon called racially dis-
criminatory elfect, and will develop this point more fully sub-
sequently. For the present, it is sufficient to note that it is
possible to draw a distinction between racially discriminatory
effect and racially disproportionate impact.45  If the constitu-
tional touchstone were racially discriminatory effect, as op-
posed to racially disproportionate impact, the concern
expressed by Justice White in Washington v. Davis with the
far-reaching implications of equating race with poverty should
be obviated to a considerable degree. Under this view of what
constitutes racial discrimination, governmental action having
a foreseeable racially discriminatory effect would be subject to
a strong burden of justification under the equal protection
clause, without the necessity of showing such action was un-
dertaken with discriminatory intent.
The distinction between racially discriminatory effect, as
the author has defined it, and racially disproportionate impact
is clearly illustrated by Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corporation.46 There a virtually
45. Other commentators who have been critical of the discriminatory intent re-
quirement do not appear to have drawn a precise distinction between racially discrimi-
natory effect and racially disproportionate impact. Professor Perry, for example, uses
the term, "disproportionate racial impact," and says that a law "having the effect of
burdening the poor.., will have the further effect of disproportionately disadvantaging
blacks." Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 540, 557 (1977). Professor Binion refers to laws or governmental actions
that "have disproportionately disadvantageous impacts." Binion, Intent and Equal Pro-
tection: A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 397, 447, Professor Eisenberg comes
closest to drawing this distinction when he refers to a "causal connection" between
uneven impact and race. Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive. Theo-
ries of Constitutional Adjudication, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 36, 40 (1977). In regard to the
matter of racially disproportionate impact, Professor Bennett has observed that
As long as racial minorities-or other groups-display significant demo-
graphic differences from the society as a whole, it is virtually inevitable that
public action will affect them differentially .... If all effects that burden even
selected minorities were forbidden, those minorities alone would have insur-
ance against any harm from political action that can hardly be justified by any
appeal to equality.
Bennett, supra note 38, at 1010. Professor Bennett, however, goes on to state: "It is not
clear, however, that a simple disproportionate impact or disadvantagement test is the
only alternative. Perhaps some effects should be forbidden, while others should not."
Id. at 1011.
46. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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all-white Chicago suburb refused to rezone land from single-
family to multi-family occupancy to permit the construction
of a racially integrated low and moderate income housing pro-
ject. In holding that no constitutional violation had been es-
tablished, the Court again emphasized that "official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a ra-
cially disproportionate impact," and that "[p]roof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection clause."'47 Here, however, the
challenged governmental action had a foreseeable racially dis-
criminatory effect in that it perpetuated a distinctly racial con-
sequence of the social history of racism, residential racial
segregation and concentration. If the rezoning had been per-
mitted at least some black families would have moved into the
suburb, thereby achieving a modest degree of residential racial
integration.48
The case was remanded to the Eighth Circuit for a deter-
mination of whether the refusal to rezone was violative of Ti-
tle VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.19 The Eighth Circuit
held that the test under Title VIII, in light of the congres-
sional purpose, was one of racially discriminatory effect rather
than racially discriminatory intent, and that at least in certain
circumstances, governmental action having a foreseeable ra-
cially discriminatory effect could be violative of Title VIII.5"
In determining whether the refusal to rezone had an imper-
missible discriminatory effect, the court emphasized that a
major purpose of Title VIII was to bring about racial integra-
tion in housing, and that the construction of the housing pro-
ject for which rezoning had been denied "would be a
significant step toward integrating the community."'"
The Eighth Circuit's approach toward defining racially
47. Id. at 264-65.
48. While the particular project for which rezoning had been denied was a project
for low and moderate income persons, the racially discriminatory effect would be the
same if rezoning had been denied for the construction of expensive townhouses which
would have a racially integrated population.
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982).
50. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1288-90 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
51. Id. at 1291.
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discriminatory effect for purposes of Title VIII is similar to
the approach that the author advocates for constitutional pur-
poses. The author's approach focuses on the effect of the chal-
lenged governmental action in relation to the distinctly racial
consequences of the social history of racism. Since a distinctly
racial consequence of that history is residential racial segrega-
tion, and the refusal to rezone perpetuated that consequence
within the particular community in this instance, there is,
under the author's approach, a racially discriminatory effect
for constitutional purposes, requiring a strong burden of
justification.
The refusal of a suburb to permit rezoning of a parcel of
land to accommodate a housing project that will bring about a
degree of racial integration is difficult to justify in terms of a
strong, countervailing governmental interest. The suburb is
not being asked to do anything affirmatively, such as to ex-
pend its own funds for construction of the project. Further-
more, a desire to keep low and moderate income people out of
the suburb hardly qualifies as an important governmental in-
terest that would justify the perpetuation of racial segregation
and the continued absence of blacks from the suburb.52 Thus,
if the constitutional standard in Arlington Heights had been
one of racially discriminatory effect, rather than discrimina-
tory intent, the refusal of the village to rezone the land would
have been violative of equal protection.
However, the Supreme Court, perhaps because of its fail-
ure to distinguish between racially disproportionate impact
and racially discriminatory effect, has held that the Constitu-
tion is not implicated by racially neutral governmental action
unless it can be shown that this action was undertaken with
racially discriminatory intent. The author will subsequently
develop the concept of racially discriminatory effect more
fully, and demonstrate that the use of this concept to deter-
mine racial discrimination for constitutional purposes is con-
52. The factors considered most significant by the Eighth Circuit in Arlington
Heights were the extent of the discriminatory effect, the government's interest in taking
the challenged action, and whether the government was being asked affirmatively to
provide housing for blacks or merely to refrain from interfering with private entities
who wanted to provide such housing. Id. at 1290-96.
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sistent with and implements the values embodied in the
fourteenth amendment and Reconstruction amendments,
taken as a whole. Before doing so, however, the article will
discuss how it may be possible under the Court's current doc-
trine to invalidate governmental action that has the effect of
disadvantaging blacks or otherwise perpetuating the present
consequences of the social history of racism without showing
present discriminatory intent on the part of the governmental
decision-maker.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF PRESENT
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
As indicated by the results in Washington v. Davis and
Arlington Heights, it is frequently very difficult to prove that
governmental actions were undertaken with present discrimi-
natory intent. The governmental actors will be careful to in-
voke neutral rather than explicitly racial reasons for their
actions, and it usually will be possible to offer a plausible ra-
cially neutral reason for the action in question. For example,
a school board wanting to maintain a large number of racially
identifiable schools can simply employ geographic attendance
zoning as the method of school assignment, thereby achieving
a condition of substantial racial segregation in the schools
without any reference to race.53 Or, university officials who
wish to exclude or limit black enrollment can impose admis-
sion standards based primarily on comparative objective aca-
demic achievement indicators, and rely on the racial
53. As Eric Schnapper has observed:
Any governmental official of the last several decades would certainly know
that repeated, overtly discriminatory acts are subject to legal challenge and
run a high risk of failure. A 'rational' segregationist school board would thus
choose (for purportedly nonracial reasons) to build schools in the centers of
black and white neighborhoods and thereafter to assign students to their
'neighborhoods schools,' rather than build schools on the borders of those
neighborhoods and assign students each year on the basis of race. The prob-
able effect on race relations is also likely to incline racist officials to favor the
discriminatory actions with the enduring effects that would obviate the need
for overtly discriminatory conduct.
Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828, 836 (1983).
696
1987] SOCIAL HISTORY OF RACISM 697
"education gap" to do the rest.54 In practice, therefore, the
success of challenges to purportedly neutral governmental ac-
tion adversely affecting blacks often depends on overcoming
the requirement of showing present discriminatory intent.
Where the governmental action challenged as racially
discriminatory was undertaken at some time in the past, when
American society was more explicit about race and racial con-
siderations were more frankly acknowledged, it is, of course,
easier to establish discriminatory intent. The Court has made
it clear that so long as the challenged governmental action can
be traced to intentional racial discrimination, no matter how
long ago it occurred, that action is unconstitutional. As the
Court stated in Keyes v. School District No. 1, with respect to
past intentional segregative acts on the part of school officials:
"If the actions; of school authorities were to any degree moti-
vated by segregative intent and the segregation resulting from
those actions continues to exist, the fact of remoteness in time
certainly does not make those actions any less 'inten-
tional.' "51 Thus, in Hunter v. Underwood,6 a provision of the
Alabama Constitution disenfranchising persons convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude, adopted at a constitutional
convention in 1901, was found to have been enacted for the
purpose of disenfranchising blacks and so was held unconsti-
tutional. 7 In that case, the expert testimony of historians,
54. See supra, note 6; Sedler, supra note 19, at 345-55.
55. 413 U.S. 189, 210-11 (1973).
56. - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 1916 (1985).
57. The evidence established that at the present time blacks were at least 1.7 times
as likely as whites to suffer disenfranchisement under this provision. Id. at 1920. This
fact alone would not amount to racially discriminatory effect under the approach the
author is proposing, since the disproportionate racial impact was probably due to the
comparatively greater poverty among blacks than whites and could not be identified as a
distinctly racial consequence of the social history of racism. However, any governmen-
tal action that is shown to have been undertaken with a racially discriminatory purpose
is for that reason alone unconstitutional. As the Court noted in Washington v. Davis:
"The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race." 426 U.S. at 607.
By the same token, "racial discrimination is not just another competing consideration,"
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265, so when it can be shown that intent to discriminate
was among the factors that influenced governmental action, such action is unconstitu-
tional unless the government in turn can meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that
the same action would have been taken "if the impermissible purpose had not been
considered." Id. at 270-71 n.21. Any intentional racial discrimination is the equivalent
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looking to the record of the convention and the statements of
the delegates, was sufficient to establish the racially discrimi-
natory purpose. As the Court concluded: "Without deciding
whether [the provision] would be valid if enacted today with-
out any impermissible motivation, we simply observe that its
original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate
against blacks on account of race and that section continues to
this day to have that effect. As such it violates equal protec-
tion .... ,8 Similarly, in Keyes and some other cases involv-
ing a claim of intentional segregative acts on the part of school
authorities, there was no dispute that those acts, occurring
some time in the past, had been undertaken with segregative
intent. 9
It is also possible to avoid the necessity of showing pres-
ent discriminatory intent where it can be demonstrated that
the otherwise racially neutral action of a governmental entity
perpetuates the present consequences of identified past inten-
tional discrimination on the part of that entity. 60 In this cir-
cumstance, it is the perpetuation of the present consequences
of the identified past discrimination that forms the basis of the
constitutional violation. This principle is illustrated by Lane
v. Wilson,6' where the Court invalidated an Oklahoma law
that had the effect of perpetuating prior racial discrimination
in voting by the state. Oklahoma had imposed a literacy test
for voting, but had included a "grandfather clause" which ef-
fectively exempted whites from the requirement. This law
was held to abridge the right to vote on account of race in
violation of the fifteenth amendment.62 Oklahoma responded
by enacting a new law which provided that all persons who
of an express racial classification, and in the absence of justification under the "strict
scrutiny" standard of review, amounts to invidious racial discrimination and is
unconstitutional.
58. Hunter, 105 S. Ct. at 1923.
59. See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 562 (1979); Columbus Bd.
of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
60. This is what Eric Schnapper calls bifurcated discrimination. "Bifurcated dis-
crimination occurs when a government official bases a present action directly or indi-
rectly on a prior discriminatory governmental decision." Schnapper, supra note 50, at
840.
61. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
62. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
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had previously voted were qualified for life, but all others had
to register within a twelve day period or be permanently dis-
enfranchised. Since the new law had the effect of perpetuating
the present consequences of the unconstitutional past discrim-
ination in favor of whites and against blacks, it too was viola-
tive of the fifteenth amendment. Should such a case arise
today, it would not be necessary to show that the new law was
enacted with discriminatory intent; it would be sufficient to
show that it perpetuates the present consequences of the past
discrimination.
Similarly, in Meredith v. Fair,63 the University of Missis-
sippi required that all applicants for admission furnish recom-
mendations from alumni. There were no black alumni
because the state had previously maintained racial segregation
in its public educational system, and blacks had been ineligible
to attend the University of Mississippi. Imposing the alumni
recommendation requirement on a black applicant would thus
perpetuate the present consequences of the identified past dis-
crimination by the state, and was therefore a denial of equal
protection. 64
Related to the principle that purportedly racially neutral
action by a governmental entity is unconstitutional if it per-
petuates the present consequences of identified past discrimi-
nation is the principle that a governmental body that has
engaged in past unconstitutional discrimination has an affirm-
ative duty to remedy the present consequences of that discrim-
ination. Until that affirmative duty has been satisfied, any
action that impedes the remedying of those consequences is
unconstitutional without regard to whether it was undertaken
with discriminatory intent. This principle has had its primary
application in regard to the elimination of de jure segregation
in the public schools. Its application has resulted in the impo-
sition of system-wide desegregation remedies even though in-
63. 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).
64. As the Court stated:
We hold that the University's requirement that each candidate for admis-
sion furnish alumni certificates is a denial of equal protection of the laws, in its
application to Negro candidates. It is a heavy burden on qualified Negro stu-
dents, because of their race. It is no burden on qualified white students.
298 F.2d at 701.
1987] 699
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
tentional segregative acts could only be shown in a small
proportion of the school system.
The Court first applied this principle in two 1972 cases,
Wright v. City Council of Emporia6 and United States v. Scot-
land Neck City Board of Education.66 Both cases involved the
formation of new school districts in states where segregation
had been required by state law pre-Brown. The Wright Court
held that a new district could not be carved out of an existing
district that had not yet converted to a unitary school system
where the effect of creating the new district "would actually
impede the process of dismantling the existing dual [school]
system. ' 67 The Court thus made it clear that until the school
system had become unitary, the school authorities had the af-
firmative duty not to take any action that had the effect of
increasing or perpetuating segregation.68 This mandate meant
that until unitary status was achieved, school authorities
could not construct any school that would open as a racially
identifiable school or permit any other school to become ra-
cially identifiable as a result of shifting racial population pat-
terns. If the affirmative duty rationale were applied to a
school district located in a state where segregation was re-
quired by state law pre-Brown, it would require the desegrega-
tion of the entire school system to the maximum extent
feasible. Until unitary status had been achieved, both the
schools that had been constructed pre-Brown and the schools
constructed afterwards would be deemed to be de jure segre-
gated. In retrospect, this rationale explains the Court's hold-
ing in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 69
65. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
66. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
67. 407 U.S. at 466. In Wright, the racial composition of the county school sys-
tem, which was under a desegregation order, was 66% black and 34% white. If the city
had been permitted to become a separate school district, it would have had a racial
composition of 52% black and 48% white, while the racial composition of the county
district would have been 72% black and 28% white. 407 U.S. at 464. In Scotland
Neck, the existing district, which was also in the process of being desegregated, was
78% black and 22% white. If the separate district had been created, it would have been
43% black, while the remaining county district would have been 89% black. 407 U.S.
at 489-90.
68. 407 U.S. at 462.
69. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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that a school system located in a state where segregation was
required by state law pre-Brown was under a constitutional
duty to desegregate the entire school system to the maximum
extent feasible. v With respect to the schools that opened or
became racially identifiable schools post-Brown, the affirma-
tive duty rationale did not require showing that the racially
identifiable character of these schools was due to intentional
segregative acts on the part of the school authorities.
The affirmative duty rationale has also provided the basis
for system-wide desegregation orders in school districts lo-
cated in states where segregation was not required by state law
pre-Brown. In those states, the predicate for a finding of de
jure segregation is a showing of intentional segregative acts on
the part of the school authorities.7 ' It was possible in practice
to show that intentional segregative acts did occur in many
school districts outside of the South. In fact, courts routinely
sustained claims of de jure segregation in those districts. 2
However, because of extensive residential segregation, it was
not necessary for the school authorities to engage in segrega-
tive acts with respect to most schools in the district. Adher-
ence to "neutral" geographic attendance zoning, without
more, would produce a large number of racially identifiable
schools.73
The intentional segregative acts that supported claims of
de jure segregation usually occurred in areas which were ex-
periencing racial residential transition and in areas where
blacks and whites lived in fairly close proximity. These acts
involved relatively few schools in the system. For example, in
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,7 4 the evidence re-
vealed that as of 1954, when Brown was decided, the school
system was maintaining four black schools that had become
racially identifiable as a result of intentionally segregative ac-
tion.75 In Columbus Board of Education v. Penick,76 the evi-
70. See Sedler, supra, note 15, at 887-91.
71. Id. at 893-97.
72. See Sedler, supra, note 12, at 545-47.
73. See supra note 15.
74. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
75. Id. at 535.
76. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
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dence revealed that the school authorities intentionally had
maintained "an enclave of separate, black schools on the near
east side of Columbus."" The plaintiffs in these cases sought
system-wide desegregation; the Court held that imposition of
such a remedy was constitutionally required.
The continued existence of de jure segregation in even a
small part of the school system makes the entire system a dual
school system for constitutional purposes. At this point, the
affirmative duty rationale takes over. Until the dual school
system is dismantled-in these cases until the few black
schools were desegregated1 8-the school board was under an
affirmative duty to prevent any other school from becoming
racially identifiable. It is thus unnecessary to demonstrate
segregative intent with respect to all of the other racially iden-
tifiable schools in the system. As the Court stated in Dayton:
But the measure of the post-Brown I conduct of a school
board under an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a dual system
is the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in de-
creasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual
system.79
The school system then is required to desegregate the entire
system, to the maximum extent feasible, based on an initial
constitutional violation involving only a few schools. As Jus-
tice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist caustically noted in dissent
in Columbus: "Here violations with respect to 5 schools, only
3 of which exist today, occurring over 30 years ago are the key
premise for a systemwide racial balance remedy involving 172
77. Id. at 456.
78. For example, in a case litigated by the author, Newburg Area Council, Inc. v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded,
418 U.S. 918 (1974), reinstated, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
931 (1975), the Jefferson County, Kentucky, school district, which covered suburban
Louisville and had only 4% black students, had operated one pre-Brown black elemen-
tary school, which had not been desegregated. By the time of the litigation, another
school had opened as a predominantly black school, and a third school had become
predominantly black as a result of changing residential patterns. In the Louisville dis-
trict, 56 of the 65 schools were pre-Brown schools, 35 of which had never changed their
racial composition. Of the 9 schools constructed since 1965, 6 opened as racially identi-
fiable schools, and 13 pre-Brown white schools, located in close proximity to the pre-
Brown black schools, had become racially identifiable black schools as the black popula-
tion expanded into those areas. See Sedler, supra note 15, at 887-89.
79. 443 U.S. at 538.
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schools-most of which did not exist in 1950.''80 It must also
be noted, however, that where no intentional segregative ac-
tions can be shown, the school district is under no obligation
to operate any of the schools on a desegregated basis.8'
The affirmative duty rationale can be relied on to invali-
date any governmental action that has the effect of perpetuat-
ing the present effects of identified prior discrimination. The
potential sweep of this principle-dependent, always, how-
ever, on a showing of identified past unconstitutional discrimi-
nation-is illustrated by the lower court case of NAACP v.
Detroit Police Officers Association.82 The City of Detroit had
voluntarily adopted a race-conscious hiring and promotional
program to remedy its admitted past discrimination against
blacks with respect to police hiring and promotions. In a
challenge to that program by white police officers, the courts
found that the city had indeed engaged in such discrimina-
tion.83 However, before the city had succeeded in reaching its
hiring and promotional goals, it was required to make layoffs
due to financial exigency. Pursuant to its collective bargaining
agreement with the police union, it made the layoffs in accord-
ance with seniority, which substantially reduced the percent-
age of black officers in all ranks. The district court held that
the effect of this use of seniority-based layoffs was violative of
the city's affirmative duty to remedy the present effects of its
identified past discrimination, and so was unconstitutional.
As the district court noted, because of the city's identified past
discrimination it had a "constitutionally imposed continuing
affirmative obligation not only to stop the discrimination but
to remedy all of the effects of the discrimination. '8 4
Thus, under the Court's current constitutional doctrine it
is sometimes possible to prevail on a claim of unconstitutional
80. Id. at 507.
81. The end result of the de jure-de facto distinction is that the constitutional right
of children to attend, and the obligation of the state to provide, racially integrated
schools at the present time depend in large measure on what happened in the school
system at some time in the past. See Sedler, supra note 15, at 919-21.
82. 591 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
83. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979); Bratton
v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
84. 591 F. Supp. at 1199.
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racial discrimination without a showing of present discrimina-
tory intent on the part of the governmental actor. However,
this can only be done when it is possible to trace the present
action having a racially discriminatory effect to past inten-
tional racial discrimination on the part of the government.
Absent this showing of causation, the foreseeable racially dis-




The proposition for which the author now contends is
that governmental action having a foreseeable racially dis-
criminatory effect should be subject to a burden of justifica-
tion. The concept of a burden of justification is designed to
avoid the problem of differing standards of review, such as
"strict scrutiny," "important and substantial relationship,"
and the like. 5 What is being suggested is that the burden of
justification should be a strong one. In determining whether
the burden has been sustained in a particular case, the Court
should consider a number of factors. These would include the
extent of the discriminatory effect, the importance of the as-
serted governmental interest, the availability of alternative
means by which that interest could be advanced, and the im-
pact of alternative means on other persons. The objective of
this approach would be to require a balancing of interests, and
unless the balance weighed strongly in favor of the govern-
ment or the interests of other persons, the governmental ac-
tion should be invalidated. Under this approach the
government must provide strong justification for any action
that has a foreseeable racially discriminatory effect. Under
the Court's current doctrine, no justification is required for
governmental action having a foreseeable racially discrimina-
85. The problem of the appropriate standard of review has surfaced in the writings
of some of the critics of the "discriminatory intent" requirement. Professor Perry, for
example, argues that the standard of review should be "flexible" and should be "more
rigorous than that required by the rational relationship test but less rigorous than that
required by the strict scrutiny test." Perry, supra note 13, at 559-61.
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tory effect, and any such action is constitutional, absent a
showing of discriminatory intent.
Critics of the discriminatory intent requirement have set
forth various grounds in support of their criticism. It has
been argued that a "motive-centered doctrine of racial dis-
crimination" is improper because it places a " 'very heavy
burden' of persuasion on the wrong side of the dispute, to the
severe detriment of the constitutional protection of racial
equality." 6  It is likewise argued that a requirement of a
showing of racially discriminatory intent "shifts constitutional
law away from its focal attention on state responsibility for
state actions," and "distorts the law by holding states consti-
tutionally responsible for what they intended to do and not for
what they have done.""7 Still another argument is that the
intent requirement is inconsistent with the ideal of equality:
''no person should suffer relative disadvantage at the hands of
the government, . . . if such disadvantage is reasonably attrib-
utable to race."'8 8 In the same vein is Professor Perry's argu-
ment that the equal protection clause embodies the principle
of the moral equality of the races, and that "a rule that all
facially neutral decisions having a disproportionate racial im-
pact are subject to a heavier burden of justification would bet-
ter serve the principle of the moral equality of the races." 8 9
The recurring theme in all of these criticisms of the dis-
criminatory intent requirement is that the requirement, by fo-
cusing on the purpose of the governmental action,9" ignores its
86. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163,
1165 (1978) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967)).
87. Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. CT.
REV. 397, 443. The author also notes that the equal protection clause should be under-
stood to protect individuals from dignitary harms, and that "[t]he commitment of the
government to the equal value of each of its citizens is measured by what government
does." Id. at 442.
88. Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 62 (1977). The author develops the "causa-
tion principle" as a "mediating principle" to embody this concept of equality. The
causation principle is "an attempt to reach the group of cases that Washington has
placed beyond the reach of existing fourteenth amendment doctrine," and focuses on
the connection between the challenged uneven impact of a racially neutral governmen-
tal action and a prior official or private race-dependent decision. Id. at 61-68.
89. Perry, supra note 4, at 1040.
90. There is still considerable disagreement on the Court as to the meaning of the
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foreseeable discriminatory effect, thereby permitting the ac-
tion to stand without requiring any justification. As the au-
thor has emphasized, a constitutional standard based on
racially discriminatory effect would do no more than impose a
burden on the government to provide justification for its ac-
tions that cause foreseeable and distinct racial consequences.
The action could still be sustained against constitutional chal-
lenge if adequate justification were provided and if the govern-
ment's interest in taking the particular action, on balance,
outweighed the foreseeable racial harm.91
Crucial to the proposition for which the author con-
tends-that the Constitution should require a burden of justi-
fication for governmental action having a foreseeable racially
discriminatory effect-is the distinction that has been drawn
between racially discriminatory effect and racially dispropor-
tionate impact. In determining whether a governmental ac-
tion has a racially discriminatory effect, the focus is on the
effect of the challenged governmental action in relation to the
distinctly racial consequences of the social history of racism.
The governmental action has a racially discriminatory effect
for constitutional purposes where the effect of that action per-
petuates those consequences and results in the continuation of
racial inequality and racial separation.
In Washington v. Davis, the inquiry as to racially discrim-
"discriminatory intent" requirement and as to what is sufficient to establish "discrimi-
natory intent" in a particular case. See Gottleib, Commentary, Reformulating the Mo-
tive/Effects Debate in Constitutional Adjudication, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 97, 98-100
(1986); Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.
REV. 31, 32-36 (1982). Mr. Schnapper contends that part of the difficulty results from
the Court's failure to distinguish between the existence of a racially discriminatory pur-
pose for undertaking governmental action and the choice of racially discriminatory
means for carrying out that action; that is, the distinction between "goals" discrimina-
tion and "means" discrimination. He maintains that, "Although means discrimination
and goals discrimination are distinct phenomena, a variety of considerations support the
conclusion that a racially-based decision regarding means is as repugnant to the Consti-
tution as a racially-based choice of goals." Schnapper, supra, at 46. Professor Gottleib
contends that "motive" and "effects" are merely "different expressions for the same
reality" and that the attempted distinction "distracts inquiry from the underlying issues
and the options actually available." Gottleib, supra, at 101.
91. Professor Binion suggests that in Washington v. Davis and the other "discrimi-
natory intent" cases the Court "equated scrutiny of unequal consequences with a find-
ing of their unconstitutionality." Binion, supra note 87, at 405.
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inatory effect should not have looked to the qualifying exami-
nation in isolation, but to the black representation in the
police force and the actions of the city with respect to such
representation. The challengers conceded that the number of
black officers in the police force was "substantial." The evi-
dence showed that 44 percent of the new police recruits were
black, and that the police department "had systematically and
affirmatively sought to enroll black officers many of whom
passed the test but failed to report for duty."92 In this circum-
stance, the city's practices with respect to the hiring of police
officers did not have a racially discriminatory effect for consti-
tutional purposes, so the constitutional challenge could not be
sustained. In Arlington Heights, by contrast,93 the refusal of
the suburb to rezone to permit the construction of the racially
integrated housing project had the effect of perpetuating a dis-
tinctly racial consequence of the social history of racism, that
of residential racial segregation and concentration. There was
thus a racially discriminatory effect for constitutional pur-
poses. Under the proposed standard, the suburb would have
had to provide a strong justification for the refusal to rezone.
A desire to keep moderate and low-income people out of the
suburb would hardly qualify as an important governmental
interest94 justifying the perpetuation of racial segregation and
the continued exclusion of blacks from the suburb. One can
conclude that in this case the suburb failed to sustain the
heavy burden of justification for the racially discriminatory ef-
fect of its refusal to rezone; therefore, the refusal to rezone
was violative of the equal protection clause.
The situation prevailing in Washington v. Davis may also
be contrasted with the situation where a suburb with little or
no black population likewise has an all-white police force, and
imposes a one-year durational residency requirement as a con-
92. 426 U.S. at 235.
93. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
94. Several state courts have held, for example, that under the state constitution a
municipality may not zone in such a way as to exclude all housing for moderate and
low-income people. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Lau-
rel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town
of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236 (1975); Township of Williston v. Ches-
terdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
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dition for appointment as a police officer. This condition will
have the foreseeable effect of excluding all blacks from consid-
eration for appointment and of keeping the police force all-
white. Like many purportedly race-neutral decisions, it inter-
acts with the present consequences of the social history of ra-
cism, here again residential racial segregation and
concentration, to produce a racially discriminatory effect
against blacks. Any legitimate interest that the suburb has in
requiring that its police officers be city residents can be satis-
fied by imposing a residency requirement after the officer is
hired.95 This being so, the one-year durational residency re-
quirement, which has a foreseeable racially discriminatory ef-
fect and does not advance any important governmental
interest that cannot be advanced by alternative means, should
be held unconstitutional.96
Likewise, because of extensive residential racial segrega-
tion and concentration, any governmental action adversely
impacting on black residential areas in comparison with white
residential areas has a foreseeable racially discriminatory ef-
fect and would require justification under the proposed ap-
proach. For example, where the municipal facilities provided
in predominantly black residential areas are distinctly inferior
to those provided in predominantly white residential areas,
there is a racially discriminatory effect for constitutional pur-
poses. Absent a strong showing of justification for the racial
difference, it should be held unconstitutional. In the pre-
Washington v. Davis case of Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,9 7 the
95. In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976), the
Court upheld against a "right to travel" challenge a requirement that a city employee be
a city resident during the period of employment. In Musto v. Redford Township, 137
Mich. App. 30, 357 N.W.2d 791 (1984), an intermediate state appellate court held viola-
tive of the equal protection clause of the United States and Michigan Constitutions a
one year durational residency requirement for employment in city police and firefighter
positions.
96. Such a requirement is violative of Title VII where the city has virtually no
black population, but there are a substantial number of blacks residing in the relevant
labor market. See United States v. Town of Cicero, 786 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1986). On
the other hand, a requirement that police officers reside in the city after appointment
does not operate to exclude blacks, and thus does not have a racially discriminatory
effect for either constitutional or Title VII purposes.
97. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), modified en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.
1972).
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Fifth Circuit held that significant disparities in the provision
of street paving, street lighting, and sanitary sewers between
black and white neighborhoods in a Mississippi town were vi-
olative of equal protection. The equal protection violation
was premised on the significant disparities; there was no in-
quiry as to whether the disparities resulted from an "intent to
discriminate" on the part of the municipal authorities. In
light of Washington v. Davis, such a discriminatory intent
must be shown, although in practice it will not be difficult to
establish discriminatory intent where significant disparities ex-
ist.98 The crucial point is that such disparities, relating to ex-
isting residential racial segregation and concentration, should
require justification because of the obvious racially discrimina-
tory effect, and in the absence thereof, should be held
unconstitutional.
Another pronounced consequence of the social history of
racism is the "educational gap" between blacks and whites.
While the specific causes of this "educational gap" are mul-
tifaceted, 99 the "educational gap" is distinctly racial, and
blacks as a group have lower levels of "academic achieve-
ment" than whites as a group. It follows that whenever eligi-
bility for employment or for admission to a university are
based on "comparative indicators of academic achievement,"
e.g., performance on standardized examinations, blacks as a
group will be disproportionately excluded in comparison with
whites as a group. In practice, this problem has largely been
obviated with respect to employment by the disproportionate
impact analysis required under Title VII and related state
laws,"° and with respect to admission to public universities by
the widespread adoption of "affirmative action" programs.101
Nonetheless, the use of racially neutral "educational criteria"
98. See, e.g., Ammons v. Dade City, Florida, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986); Dow-
dell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983). In a number of these cases, the
disparities will be so great as to give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent, be-
cause they are "explicable only on racial grounds." Ammons, 783 F.2d at 988; Dowdell,
698 F.2d at 1186.
99. See supra note 6; Sedler, supra note 19, at 349-55.
100. See supra note 31.
101. See Sedler, Racial Preference and the Constitution: The Societal Interest in the
Equal Participation Objective, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1227, 1250-53 (1980).
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to determine eligibility for employment or admission to a uni-
versity is another example of what is meant by a racially dis-
criminatory effect for constitutional purposes.
This example also serves to illustrate the balancing called
for under the proposed approach. Suppose that a city with a
substantial black population has relatively few black police of-
ficers and bases eligibility for employment on comparative
performance on standardized examinations. Suppose also that
the standardized examinations are found to be job-related, °2
but the effect of using the examination to determine eligibility
for employment is to exclude practically all blacks. Or a state
university law school decides that it wants only the "best-
qualified" students, and admits students solely on the basis of
comparative LSAT scores, with the result that very few black
students are admitted. In these examples, the governmental
body has furnished a valid justification for its actions that
have produced a racially discriminatory effect. The approach
advocated by this article would require the courts to engage in
a careful balancing of the strength of the asserted governmen-
tal interest against the racial consequences resulting from the
advancement of that interest. It is not necessary to indicate
how the balance should be struck here, particularly since both
situations are largely hypothetical. However, what these ex-
amples illustrate is that adoption of the suggested approach
would not necessarily result in the invalidation of all govern-
mental action having a foreseeable racially discriminatory ef-
fect. It would require that the government sustain a strong
burden of justification, insuring that only actions that could be
supported under this burden of justification would be upheld
as constitutional. The end result would be that the govern-
ment would need a very good reason for undertaking any ac-
tion that has a racially discriminatory effect.
Such an approach would also require justification for
governmental decisions that are based on what has been re-
ferred to as "a greater willingness to see a given burden borne
by blacks than by whites."' 3 The example posited here is that
involving the location of a needed urban freeway, where the
102. Recall the qualifying test in Washington v. Davis. See supra note 33.
103. Schnapper, supra note 90, at 40.
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suggestion has been made that the decision-maker may weigh
the "burdens/benefits" equation differently depending on
whether the burden falls on blacks rather than whites. The
decision-maker may decide that the freeway should be built,
even though it. will run through and destroy part of a black
community, but reject the project if the only route is through
a white community.I°4 It has been cogently argued that a ra-
cially-based decision regarding means is as equally unconstitu-
tional as a racially-based decision regarding goals, °5 and it
may be assumed that this is what the Court would hold if
squarely presented with the question.
Under the author's approach, however, it would not be
necessary to establish that the decision to build the freeway
through the black community was racially-based in the sense
that the decision-maker intentionally weighed the "burdens/
benefits" equation differently depending on whether the bur-
den falls on blacks rather than whites. Because of extensive
racial segregation and concentration, the decision as to
whether to locate the freeway necessarily has racial implica-
tions. The decision-maker necessarily will be aware of the ra-
cial composition of the community through which the freeway
will run, and in this example would know that it would de-
stroy part of the black community. Because the decision as to
the location of the freeway necessarily has this foreseeable ra-
cial effect, it would be subject to a strong burden of justifica-
tion. If it could be shown, for example, that there are
alternative sites that would serve the purpose as well, e.g., a
site located in a sparsely populated area, the burden of justifi-
cation could not be sustained, and the proposed construction
of the freeway through the black community would be consti-
tutionally invalid. It may be that the site in the black commu-
nity is the only feasible site, and since, in our example, the
freeway admittedly is needed, the government would have
sustained its burden of justification. On the other hand, if the
freeway is only of marginal utility, the fact that it may destroy
a part of the black community affects the constitutional bal-
ancing, and may lead to the conclusion that the construction
104. Id. at 39.
105. Id. at 46-51.
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of the freeway, because of its foreseeable racial effect, is consti-
tutionally impermissible.
The balancing that is advocated under this approach
would also take into account the extent of the discriminatory
effect of the challenged governmental action. The less the ex-
tent of the impact of the action on blacks, the less that would
be required in terms of justification. In City of Memphis v.
Greene,'O6 the Supreme Court dealt with a challenge to the
closing of a city street traversing a white residential area that
was adjacent to a black residential area. The challenge was
based primarily on the "equal enjoyment of property" provi-
sion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 107 In finding that the Act
was not violated by the challenged action, the majority, look-
ing to the evidence presented in the district court, concluded
that: (1) the extent of inconvenience to the adjacent black res-
idents as a result of the diversion of traffic was not great;
(2) the diversion of traffic would not have the effect of limiting
the social or commercial contact between residents of the ad-
jacent areas; (3) the street closure would not cause deprecia-
tion of property values in the black residential area; and
(4) while the particular closure conferred a benefit on certain
white property owners, there was no reason to believe that the
city would refuse to confer a comparable benefit on black
property owners."°8 The asserted governmental interest justi-
fying the closure was that of "protecting the safety and tran-
quility of a residential neighborhood."' 0 9 While the dissent
saw the racial harm resulting from the challenged action as
being more significant than the majority did, 110 both the ma-
jority and the dissent balanced the strength of the asserted
governmental interest against what they perceived to be the
extent of the racial harm resulting from the challenged action.
It is this type of balancing, done here for purposes of deter-
mining whether there was a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982,
that the author advocates to determine the constitutional per-
106. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
108. 451 U.S. at 110-19.
109. Id. at 119.
110. Id. at 137-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 40:677712
SOCIAL HISTORY OF RACISM
missibility of governmental action having a foreseeable ra-
cially discriminatory effect.
The proposed approach could lead to a different result in
Palmer v. Thompson."'I That case, until its "clarification" by
the Court in Washington v. Davis, seemed to "[lend] support
for the proposition that the operative effect of the law rather
than its purpose is the paramount factor."' 1 2 In upholding as
constitutional a city's decision to close its public swimming
pools rather than operate them on a racially integrated basis,
the Court emphasized that the city was "extending identical
treatment to both whites and Negroes."' 3 The stated reason
for the closure in that case was that closure was necessary "to
preserve peace and order" and that integrated pools could not
be economically operated. According to the Court in Wash-
ington v. Davis, the holding of Palmer v. Thompson, as it bore
on a showing of discriminatory intent, was that "the legiti-
mate purposes of the ordinance-to preserve peace and avoid
deficits-were not open to impeachment by evidence that
the councilmen were actually motivated by racial
considerations." 14
However, the effect of the pool closure was to prevent
racial integration in public facilities, and in this context, to
perpetuate a specific consequence of the social history of ra-
cism in southern states, the separation of blacks and whites in
public facilities. The effect then was racially discriminatory
for constitutional purposes, because it maintained racial sepa-
ration in public facilities: the city chose to close the swim-
ming pools rather than operate them on a racially integrated
basis, and thus to prevent blacks and whites from interacting
in public facilities. The justification that the city could ad-
vance for the closing was weak. The pools had operated at a
deficit even when segregated,' 1 5 so the concern with avoiding
deficits seems misplaced. Moreover, there was no more rea-
111. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
112. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 243.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The fees were deliberately kept low, and the city was absorbing an annual loss
of approximately $11,700 on three pools. Id. at 252 (White, J., dissenting).
1987] 713
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
sonable basis for concluding that there would be racial conflict
when the pools were operated on a racially integrated basis
than there would be for concluding that there would be racial
conflict when the public schools were desegregated. Indeed,
such a position is completely inconsistent with the premises of
Brown and its progeny, which hold that the government can-
not require racial segregation in public facilities. 1 6 Because
the closure of the pools had a racially discriminatory effect for
constitutional purposes, and because the reasons given for the
closure are not supportable, under the approach advocated by
the author, the closure of the pools should be held to be
unconstitutional.
Likewise, in the "state action" case of Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis,"7 it is possible to find a racially discriminatory
effect for constitutional purposes because of the relationship
between governmental action and private discrimination. In
that case, the state issued liquor licenses to private clubs,
which allowed these clubs to serve liquor after the normal
closing hours for public establishments serving alcoholic bev-
erages. These licenses were issued according to a complex
formula, and no more licenses could be issued in the city
where the Moose Lodge club was located. Moose Lodge fol-
lowed a policy of racial discrimination in membership and re-
fused to permit the use of its facilities by black guests of its
members. The Court held that the practice of racial discrimi-
nation by Moose Lodge with respect to the service of after-
hours liquor was not subject to constitutional challenge, be-
cause Moose Lodge was a private entity and because there was
116. It may be recalled that in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), state-
imposed racial segregation in public facilities was justified on the ground that the state
could act "with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the peo-
ple, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the
public peace and good order." As Justice White pointedly observed in Palmer v.
Thompson:
The fact is that closing the pools is an expression of official policy that Ne-
groes are unfit to associate with whites. Closing pools to prevent interracial
swimming is little different from laws or customs forbidding Negroes and
whites from eating together or from cohabiting or intermarrying. The Equal
Protection Clause is a hollow promise if it does not forbid such official deni-
gration of the race the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect.
403 U.S. 217, 240-41 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
117. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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no "state involvement" in its racially discriminatory practices.
The mere grant of a liquor license did not constitute "state
action," and the Court made it clear that the state was not
required to prohibit racial discrimination on the part of hold-
ers of state-issued liquor licenses. 1 8
In his dissent, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, emphasized that the effect of the issuance of the liquor
license to Moose Lodge, when no additional licenses were
available in the city, was to restrict the ability of blacks to
obtain liquor, since liquor was commercially available only at
private clubs for a significant portion of the week, and since a
group wishing to form a non-discriminatory club, which
would serve liquor after-hours to blacks, would be highly un-
likely to be able to obtain a license.11 9 As one commentator
has observed, in that case, "a sufficient causal connection be-
tween race and harm can be established."' 2 ° The issuance of a
liquor license to a private club that overtly practiced racial
discrimination, in circumstances where such licenses were dif-
ficult to obtain, had the foreseeable racially discriminatory ef-
fect of restricting the ability of blacks to obtain after-hours
liquor service. Under the approach the author advocates, the
state would be required to show a strong justification for issu-
ing a liquor license to this kind of private club. Since the pri-
vate club would not be impaired in its ability to carry out its
organizational purposes if it did not discriminate on racial
grounds,' 2' it is difficult to see how the state can justify issuing
118. Id. at 178-79.
119. Id. at 181-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
120. Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 77. The author goes on to observe:
Although the evidence did not suggest that the state approved or encouraged
the private club's discriminatory practices, the effect of the state's action was
to allocate a limited resource, liquor licenses, in a way that reduced the
number of establishments at which blacks could purchase liquor. Under a
causation approach, two central issues would have been easily resolved: race
was a cause in fact of the uneven impact on blacks and the connection between
the two was clearly proximate.
Id. at 77-78.
121. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), the Court, in uphold-
ing against first amendment challenge the application of the state's anti-discrimination
law to reach gender-based discrimination by a private membership organization, em-
phasized that the admission of women as members would not interfere with the organi-
zation's ability to carry on its organizational activities. Moose Lodge was a social club,
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a scarce liquor license to such a club.
One final example of racially discriminatory effect is that
of at-large electoral districts. The existence of at-large electo-
ral districts, as opposed to geographic electoral districts, fre-
quently has the effect of diluting black political power, not
only by reducing the probability that black candidates will be
elected, but also by reducing the impetus for any candidate to
be responsive to what may be called the "racial concerns" of
black voters. In this connection, it is necessary to recognize
the reality of race in American society, and the fact that not
infrequently the race of the candidate and racial concerns in-
fluence the outcomes of elections. 122  Where a substantial
number of blacks reside in a governmental unit, given exten-
sive racial segregation and concentration, blacks, although in
the minority overall, will be able to elect one or more candi-
dates if geographic electoral districts are employed. Experi-
ence indicates that often the candidate elected from a "black
district" will be black, but sometimes that candidate will be a
white person, who because of the racial composition of his/
her constituency, will be responsive to their racial concerns.
If all candidates are elected at-large, however, it is much less
likely that a black will be elected, and as far as the "racial
interests" of black and white voters may appear to be in con-
flict, 123 all the candidates are likely to come down on the side
of "white interests." As the Supreme Court has observed:
"Voting along racial lines allows those elected to ignore black
interests without fear of political consequences, and without
not an organization like the Ku Klux Klan, which has as its avowed purpose the pro-
motion of racial hatred and white supremacy.
122. In United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977),
the Court upheld against constitutional challenge the use of race-conscious criteria in
legislative districting so as to achieve effective black majorities in the percentage of legis-
lative districts corresponding to the percentage of black population in the county. Ac-
cording to the plurality opinion of Justice White, this use of race-conscious criteria was
justified in order to "achieve a fair allocation of political power between white and non-
white voters." Id. at 167. However, the state cannot affirmatively induce racial preju-
dice in voting, such as by requiring that the race of candidates be designated on the
ballot. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
123. For example, there may be a controversy over whether the governmental unit
should adopt an "affirmative action" program with respect to police hiring, so as to
increase the number of black police officers.
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bloc voting the minority candidates would not lose elections
solely because of their race." 124
Under the Court's current constitutional doctrine, the
use of at-large or multi-member electoral districts violates
equal protection only if this method of election was estab-
lished or was maintained with racially discriminatory in-
tent. 25 As stated above, with the continued existence of racial
prejudice in American society today, 26 it cannot be denied
that most of the time, the effect of the use of this method of
electing officials will be to dilute black political power. Here,
adoption of the proposed racially discriminatory effect ap-
proach would confront the Court with a hard "value choice."
Should it interpret the equal protection clause to foreclose the
use of at-large or multi-member electoral districts because of
the adverse effect that the use of this method has on black
political power? Or should it, as Justice Stevens has argued,
refuse to "con stitutionalize" racial consciousness and racial
bloc voting in the political process by requiring a method of
voting that "motivate[s] disadvantaged racial and ethnic
groups to vote! as identifiable units"? 27  It is not suggested
here how the Court should resolve this hard value choice.
124. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982). In that case, blacks made up 38%
of the registered voters in a county where the county commissioners were elected at
large, and although there had been black candidates, no black had ever been elected as a
county commissioner. The district court found that there was "overwhelming evidence
of bloc voting along racial lines." Id. at 623.
125. 458 U.S. 613; Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
126. In two recent cases, the Court had the occasion to take cognizance of the con-
tinued existence of racial prejudice in American society. In Palmore v. Sidoti, where
the Court held violative of equal protection a state court's denial of child custody to a
white mother because her new husband was black, the Court observed:
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices do not exist
or that all manifestations of those prejudices have been eliminated.... The
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly
or indirectly give them effect.
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). Similarly in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court held that the
intentional use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor to strike blacks from juries
trying a black defendant was violative of equal protection, noting that "the Equal Pro-
tection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of
their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to
consider the State's case against a black defendant." - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719
(1986).
127. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 651-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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But, one of the consequences of the suggested approach is that
the Court would sometimes have to make such choices, and
the value result, so to speak, would not depend on whether in
a particular case it could be shown that the action diluting the
political power of black voters was undertaken with discrimi-
natory intent.
The same kind of hard value choice would be required
with respect to the matter of racial integration in the public
schools. As the author has discussed more fully elsewhere,
under the Court's current dejure segregation doctrine, the en-
titlement of children, black and white, to attend racially inte-
grated schools depends on a showing that at some time in the
past the school district in which the child is enrolled has prac-
ticed dejure segregation."28 Numerous commentators, the au-
thor included, have maintained that, in light of fourteenth
amendment values, there should be a constitutional obligation
on the part of school districts, without regard to identified
past dejure segregation, to operate racially integrated schools,
to the maximum extent feasible. 29 The countervailing argu-
ment is that geographic attendance zoning advances certain
governmental interests related to the operation of "neighbor-
hood schools," and that since the school districts are not re-
sponsible for residential racial segregation and concentration,
they should not be precluded from operating "neighborhood
schools," despite the fact that many of these schools will be
racially identifiable. 30 While the author's own view is that
the constitutional balance strongly weighs in favor of integra-
tion, " ' the Supreme Court may or may not strike the balance
the same way. The point to be emphasized is that it is the
function of the Supreme Court to make these kinds of difficult
value choices, and the right of school children to attend a ra-
cially integrated school should depend on how the Court re-
solves this value choice and not on the requirements of state
law or the actions of school authorities at some time past.
In this section of the writing, the author has tried to ex-
128. Sedler, supra note 15, at 916-26.
129. See id. at 944-53.
130. Id. at 953-54.
131. Id. at 954-56.
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plicate fully the meaning of racially discriminatory effect for
constitutional purposes. The author has attempted to distin-
guish racially discriminatory effect from racially dispropor-
tionate impact and demonstrate that this distinction is a
tenable one. The author's submission is that whenever gov-
ernmental action has a foreseeable racially discriminatory ef-
fect, the Corstitution should require a strong burden of
justification. A number of examples of racially discriminatory
effect have been discussed, along with the burden of justifica-
tion with respect to those examples. Sometimes, the burden of
justification, once it is required, clearly cannot be sustained.
At other times, the question is a closer one, and, in some cir-
cumstances, the Court will be put to hard value choices in
striking the constitutional balance.
What has not yet been done is to set forth a constitutional
argument in support of the proposition for which the author
contends. What is the basis for concluding that the constitu-
tional standard should be discriminatory effect, and that gov-
ernmental action having a foreseeable racially discriminatory
effect should be unconstitutional unless supported by strong
justification has not yet been explained? The author submits
that the racially discriminatory effect standard is the constitu-
tionally appropriate standard because it serves to implement
the constitutional values embodied in the fourteenth amend-
ment and Reconstruction amendments as a whole. The dis-
criminatory intent standard, in contrast, results in upholding
as constitutional governmental action that is inconsistent with
and serves to impede the advancement of those values in con-
temporary American society.
The implementation of constitutional values argument is
also the argument that the author advances to support the
constitutionality of racial preference designed to overcome the
present consequences of the social history of racism which
have placed blacks in a societally subordinate position and
prevented the realization of "genuine equality" between
blacks and whites in American society. 132 Just as the Court
has required a showing of racially discriminatory intent in or-
132. The term "genuine equality" is taken from Justice Marshall's opinion in
Bakke.
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der to invalidate governmental action having a discriminatory
effect on blacks, it has held that the use of race-conscious cri-
teria resulting in racial preference for blacks is constitution-
ally permissible when it is undertaken for the purpose of
remedying identified past unlawful racial discrimination on
the part of the governmental entity employing such criteria.
While the Court has upheld the use of race-conscious criteria
benefiting blacks in other limited circumstances, for the most
part, it has focused on remedying identified past unlawful ra-
cial discrimination. The Court has specifically rejected the
contention that the government may use race-conscious crite-
ria generally for the purpose of overcoming the present conse-
quences of the social history of racism that have placed blacks
in a societally subordinate position.
The next section of the article, therefore, will discuss the
Court's current constitutional doctrine with respect to the
permissibility of employing race-conscious criteria benefiting
blacks-racial preference-in governmental programs and op-
erations. This discussion will demonstrate the relationship be-
tween the discriminatory intent requirement and the
remedying of identified past unlawful racial discrimination in
regard to the Constitution and the consequences of the social
history of racism. This section will also discuss briefly the au-
thor's view of the equal participation objective, which has
been developed more fully elsewhere.
The concluding section of the article will set forth the
author's implementation of constitutional values argument,
which is relied on both to support the discriminatory effect
standard and the equal participation objective. The conclu-
sion will be that, in light of constitutional values, the Consti-
tution should be interpreted both as requiring and permitting
the government to take account of the consequences of the
social history of racism, which have produced a condition of
racial inequality in the United States today.
RACIAL PREFERENCE AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF
THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF RACISM
The question with which the discussion is now concerned
is the constitutional permissibility of racial preference for
720
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blacks in governmental programs and operations. Racial pref-
erence in this regard means that the racial status of a person is
affirmatively taken into account by governmental entities in
such matters as determining admission to a publicly-sup-
ported university,'3 3 hiring and promotion in public employ-
ment, 3 4 or entitlement to governmental contracts. 3 5 The use
of racial preference benefiting blacks is, of course, a race-based
classification, and is thus subject to "strict scrutiny."1 36
The Constitution does not prohibit all use of race-con-
scious criteria in governmental decision-making. Analyti-
cally, constitutional doctrine in regard to racial equality has
developed with reference to the concept of invidious racial dis-
crimination.1 37  The Constitution proscribes invidious racial
discrimination,'3 8 which may be defined as the use of race-
conscious criteria that is not "justified by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest," or is not "narrowly tailored to the
achievement of that goal."' 139 Conversely, where this demand-
133. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
134. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979).
135. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
136. As the Court has stated, "The Court has recognized that the level of scrutiny
does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group
that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination." Wygant v. Jack-
son Bd. of Educ., -- U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1846 (1986) (Opinion of Powell, J.).
137. See Sedler, supra note 19, at 368-72. It has been contended that the Constitu-
tion should be interpreted to prohibit the "differential treatment of other human beings
by race," Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, The Supreme Court, and the Constitu-
tion, 46 U. Cmi. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979), and that "the proper constitutional principle
is not no 'invidious' racial or ethnic discrimination, but no use of racial or ethnic criteria
in the distribution of governmental benefits or burdens." Posner, The DeFunis Case and
the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 25. The Court, however, has not interpreted the Constitution to prohibit "differential
treatment on the basis of race" where such "differential treatment" does not amount to
invidious racial discrimination. As Dean Sandalow has noted: "A constitutional prin-
ciple that government may not distribute burdens or benefits on racial or ethnic grounds
is required neither by the 'intentions of the framers' nor by a more general principle of
constitutional law." Sandalow, Racial Preference in Higher Education: Political Re-
sponsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CNi. L. REV. 653, 675 (1975).
138. As the Court stated in Loving v. Virginia, "[t]he clear and central purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial
discrimination in the states," and that if a racial classification is ever to be upheld, it
"must be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, in-
dependent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth
Amendment to eliminate." 388 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1967).
139. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846 (Opinion of Powell, J.). While all members of the
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ing test is satisfied, the use of race-conscious criteria in the
particular circumstance does not amount to invidious racial
discrimination, and thus is not unconstitutional despite the
detriment that it causes to adversely affected persons because
of their race. 140
Whenever the government uses race-conscious criteria
benefiting blacks in its programs and operations, the constitu-
tional inquiry is two-fold. First, the Court must determine
whether the asserted governmental interest advanced by the
use of race-conscious criteria is "compelling." Second, once
the asserted interest is found to be "compelling," the Court
must then determine whether the particular means used are
"narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal." For ex-
ample, in Bakke, five Justices were of the view that the medi-
cal school's interest in achieving a racially diverse student
body was "compelling," so as to justify the use of race-con-
scious criteria in determining admission, 4 1 but Justice Powell,
who was the "swing" Justice in that case, took the position
that the use of a strict racial quota was not "precisely tailored
to the achievement of that goal."14 2
Court agree that the use of race-conscious criteria resulting in disadvantage to persons
because of their race must be subject to "strict scrutiny," there has been some difference
on the Court as to the proper formulation of the standard when applied to the use of
race-conscious criteria for "remedial purposes." In that circumstance, Justices Mar-
shall, Brennan, and Blackmun have said that the use of race-conscious criteria is per-
missible if it is "substantially related to the achievement of important governmental
objectives." Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1861 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor,
who accepts Justice Powell's formulation, contends that "the disparities between the
two tests do not preclude a fair measure of consensus," and that the distinction between
a "compelling" and an "important" governmental purpose "may be a negligible one."
Id. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In the author's own view, the precise formula-
tion of the standard of review is not significant. In every case the Court must decide
whether the governmental interest assertedly advanced by the use of racial preference is
of sufficient validity and importance to justify the racial detriment to the adversely af-
fected whites. It must also decide whether the particular use of race-conscious criteria
is an appropriate means of implementing that interest. See Sedler, Beyond Bakke: The
Constitution and Redressing the Social History of Racism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
133, 141-44 (1979).
140. See Sedler, supra note 139, at 157-62; Sedler, supra note 101, at 1228-31.
141. The five Justices were Justice Powell in a separate opinion, Bakke, 438 U.S. at
311-15, and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, who agreed with Justice
Powell on this point in order to establish a majority holding. Id. at 326 n. 1.
142. Id. at 320. He maintained that the university could give "competitive consid-
eration to race and ethnic origin" as one of the factors determining admission. Cf
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The question then is what interests are "compelling" so
as to justify the use of race-conscious criteria benefiting
blacks. When the Court concludes that a particular interest is
"compelling" for this purpose, it has made the value judgment
that this interest is of sufficient importance and legitimacy to
justify the resulting racial detriment to the adversely affected
whites. The one interest that the Court clearly has recognized
as "compelling" is the interest in alleviating the present conse-
quences of identified past discrimination on the part of the
governmental entity using racial preference. As Justice Pow-
ell stated in Bakke: "The State certainly has a legitimate and
substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasi-
ble, the disabling effects of identified discrimination." '43 Simi-
larly, as Justice O'Connor stated in Wygant: "The Court is in
agreement that, whatever the formulation employed, remedy-
ing past or present racial discrimination by a state actor is a
sufficiently weighty interest to warrant the remedial use of a
carefully constructed affirmative action program."''  The
remedying of identified past discrimination was the basis of
the Court's decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 45 upholding the
constitutionality of a 10 percent minority business enterprise
"set aside" required by Congress in federally-assisted con-
struction projects.1 4 6
Geier v. Alexander, 801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1986), (use of a racial quota in determining
admission to a public university's pre-professional programs was upheld as a proper
means of overcoming the present consequences of identified past racial discrimination in
public higher education).
143. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (Opinion of Powell, J.).
144. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. See supra, note 134.
146. See Sedler, supra note 101, at 1257-8 n.139. See also Sedler, supra note 139, at
146-51. The past discrimination has violated the rights of blacks as a group, and the
racial preference is designed to remedy the injury to group interests. As Justice Bren-
nan observed in Bakke, "Such relief does not require as a predicate proof that recipients
of preferential advancement have been individually discriminated against; it is enough
that each recipient is within a general class of persons likely to have been the victims of
discrimination." 438 U.S. at 363. The Reagan Administration has argued that all racial
preference in governmental operations is unconstitutional unless the beneficiaries are
the individual victims of identified prior discrimination. This position, however, finds
no support in the Court's current constitutional doctrine. See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at
1853. ("It is agreed that a plan need not be limited to the remedying of specific in-
stances of identified discrimination for it to be deemed sufficiently 'narrowly tailored,' or
Isubstantially related,' to the correction of prior discrimination by the state actor."). In
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When a governmental entity has engaged in identified
past discrimination, such discrimination, except for that pro-
scribed by statute,1 47 must be found to be in violation of the
Constitution, and as previously noted, the Constitution only
prohibits intentional racial discrimination. In other words,
the unconstitutional discrimination that the government may
remedy by the use of racial preference is only racial discrimi-
nation undertaken with discriminatory intent. Moreover, as
discussed previously, where the government has engaged in
past unconstitutional discrimination, it has the affirmative
duty to take action to overcome the continuing effects of such
discrimination. 148 This being so, for the Court to say that the
Constitution permits the use of racial preference by the gov-
ernment in order to remedy the present consequences of the
government's own identified past discrimination adds little to
what the Constitution already requires. If a city, for example,
has engaged in past unconstitutional racial discrimination by
intentionally refusing to hire blacks as police officers, it has
the affirmative duty to adopt a race-conscious hiring program
in order to remedy the present consequences of its identified
past discrimination. 149 Thus, the end result of the Court's per-
United States v. Paradise, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987), the Court upheld the
judicial imposition of a racial promotion quota in order to remedy the State of Ala-
bama's persistent refusal to adopt promotion procedures that would overcome the pres-
ent effects of its past racial discrimination with respect to the hiring and promotion of
black officers in the state police force. Under that order, the state police force was
required to promote one qualified black officer for every white officer promoted until
25% of the officers in each rank were black, or until the force had developed and imple-
mented a promotional plan without adverse impact on blacks for the relevant rank. In a
similar vein, the Reagan Administration has argued that the federal courts lack the
power under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to order an affirmative hiring
remedy for identified past employment discrimination that goes beyond redress for the
specific victims, a position that the Court squarely rejected in Local 28 of Sheet Metal
Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct.
3019 (1986). See also Geier v. Alexander, 801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1986) (court rejected
the Reagan Administration's argument that the equal protection clause precluded ap-
proval of a consent decree requiring the admission of a specified number of minority
students to the pre-professional program of a public university located in a state that
had not yet succeeded in desegregating its system of public higher education).
147. The statutory violation by the governmental entity may be based on a showing
of disproportionate racial impact. See supra note 31.
148. See supra notes 62-81 and accompanying text.
149. See NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1194, 1199 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (court referred to "a constitutionally imposed continuing affirmative obli-
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mitting the use of racial preference to overcome the present
consequences of identified past discrimination is that the gov-
ernmental body may voluntarily choose to remedy its past dis-
crimination, without waiting to be sued by the class of
adversely affected black persons. Even then, the issue of past
racial discrimination may have to be litigated if the racial pref-
erence program is challenged by adversely affected whites.15 °
When it comes to eliminating the present consequences of
the social history of racism, focusing on the remedying of
identified past discrimination by the governmental entity that
is using racial preference in an effort to overcome those conse-
quences comes close to bringing one full circle. The govern-
ment is not constitutionally required to take account of the
consequences of the social history of racism in the sense that
racially neutral governmental action having a racially discrim-
inatory effect is not unconstitutional in the absence of a show-
ing of discriminatory intent. Likewise, as a general
proposition, the government may not be constitutionally per-
mitted to make use of racial preference in its programs and
operations solely for the purpose of overcoming the present
consequences of the social history of racism. Thus, a showing
of racially discriminatory intent becomes the constitutional
predicate for determining the validity of governmental action
that on the one hand aggravates, or on the other hand, at-
tempts to alleviate, the present consequences of the social his-
tory of racism.
The Court has held that some interests other than over-
coming the present consequences of identified past discrimina-
tion may be sufficiently "compelling," so as to justify the use
of race-conscious criteria. These interests include a public
university's interest in achieving a racially diverse student
gation not only to stop the discrimination but to remedy all of the effects of the
discrimination").
150. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979). In
such a case, however, the government need not prove that it was guilty of past discrimi-
nation, as the class of black victims would have to do if it were challenging the govern-
ment's failure to hire blacks. It is a sufficient defense to a suit by adversely affected
whites that "the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is re-
quired." Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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body, 5' the government's interest in maintaining racial inte-
gration in its programs and operations, 52 and the interest of
racial minorities in obtaining a fair allocation of political
power.' And it may be true, as Justice O'Connor noted in
Wygant, that "[c]ertainly nothing the Court has said today
151. It was on this point that Justice Powell and the "Brennan four" agreed in
Bakke. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. In Wygant, the school board
and the teacher's collective bargaining representative agreed to a provision providing for
out-of-line seniority layoffs in order to maintain the existing ratio of black to white
teachers. One of the justifications for this provision was that black teachers were neces-
sary in order to provide "role models" for black students. Justice Powell, joined on this
point by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, took the position
that the "role model" claim was an insufficient justification for the use of racial prefer-
ence. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847-48. However, the main thrust of the school board's
"role model" claim went to the interest in achieving a racially integrated faculty, and
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, and Justice Stevens in a
separate opinion, took the position that faculty integration was a sufficiently important
governmental interest to justify the use of racial preference in the circumstances
presented. Id. at 1862-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Id. at 1867-68 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). As Justice Stevens put it:
In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that a school board may
reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits
to the student body that could not be provided by an all white, or nearly all
white, faculty. For one of the most important lessons that the American pub-
lic schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds
that have been brought together in our famous 'melting pot' do not identify
essential differences among the human beings that inhabit our land. It is one
thing for a white child to be taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty,
is only 'skin deep'; it is far more convincing to experience that truth on a day
to day basis during the routine, ongoing learning process.
Id. at 1868. Justice O'Connor took the position that "the goal of providing 'role-mod-
els' discussed by the courts below should not be confused with the very different goal of
promoting racial diversity among the faculty," and that since faculty integration was
not properly asserted as a justification for the use of racial preference here, it was not
"necessary to discuss the magnitude of that interest or its applicability in this case." Id.
at 1854 n.*. It may be that, in an appropriate case, there will be five votes on the Court
for upholding faculty integration as a sufficiently important governmental interest to
justify the use of racial preference.
152. See Sedler, supra note 139, at 158-59. School boards, for example, can volun-
tarily assign students on a racial basis even to the point of requiring that "each school
should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for
the district as a whole." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971). For this reason, a state law prohibiting school boards from transporting stu-
dents for the purpose of racial integration, but permitting transportation for other pur-
poses, constitutes an impermissible "racial singling out" and is violative of equal
protection. Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
153. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977);
Sedler, supra note 139, at 159-60.
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necessarily forecloses the possibility that the Court will find
other governmental interests ... to be sufficiently 'important'
or 'compelling' to sustain the use of affirmative action poli-
cies." '154 Nonetheless, overcoming the present consequences
of identified past discrimination on the part of the particular
governmental entity is the "most secure" basis for upholding
the use of racial preference against constitutional challenge,
and it may be expected that whenever possible, the govern-
mental entity will try to defend the challenge on this basis. 155
What the Court has been unwilling to hold is that over-
coming the present consequences of the social history of ra-
cism itself is a "compelling" governmental interest, justifying
the use of race-conscious criteria benefiting blacks. This inter-
est was asserted in Bakke, where the medical school argued
that its race-conscious admissions program was designed to
overcome a discrete consequence of that history, the shortage
of black and other minority physicians.156 Justice Powell
posed the question in terms of whether the medical school was
justified in using race-conscious criteria for the purpose of
"helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medi-
cal School perceived as victims of 'societal discrimination,'"
and he concluded that it was not. He stated:
[this purpose] does not justify a classification that imposes
disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no
responsibility whatsoever for whatever harm the benefi-
ciaries of the special admissions program are thought to
have suffered. To hold otherwise would be to convert a
remedy heretofore reserved for the violation of legal rights
into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation
could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are per-
ceived as victims of societal discrimination. 157
And in distinguishing remedying "societal discrimination"
154. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
155. As Justice O'Connor stated in Wygant: "The Court is in agreement that,
whatever the formulation employed, remedying past or present racial discrimination by
a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a
carefully constructed affirmative action program." Id.
156. The school also asserted that its program was designed to overcome the inabil-
ity of minorities, as a group, to compete equally with whites for scarce places in the
medical school. See Sedler, supra note 19, at 345-55.
157. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (Opinion of Powell, J.).
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from remedying identified past discrimination, Justice Powell
observed that the latter goal "[is] far more focused than the
remedying of the effects of 'societal discrimination,' an amor-
phous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into
the past." 1 8 In Wygant, Justice Powell also emphasized that:
"This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court
has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of ra-
cial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination." 5 9
In Bakke, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, related the shortage of black and
other minority physicians to the social history of racism and
concluded that:
Davis' articulated purpose of remedying the effects of soci-
etal discrimination is, under our cases, sufficiently impor-
tant to justify the use of race-conscious admissions
programs where there is a sound basis for concluding that
minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic,
and that the handicap of past discrimination is impeding
access of minorities to the Medical School. 60
However, there were only four votes for this position in
Bakke, 161 and it has never commanded a majority of the
Court. As things now stand, overcoming the present conse-
quences of the social history of racism itself is not a "compel-
ling" governmental interest justifying the use of race-
conscious criteria benefiting blacks.
The author has elsewhere developed at length the thesis
that the Constitution should permit the use of race-conscious
criteria designed to advance what he refers to as the equal par-
ticipation objective.' 62 The equal participation objective relates
directly to overcoming the present consequences of the social
history of racism. It refers to the equal participation of blacks
as a group with whites as a group in all important aspects of
158. Id. at 307.
159. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847 (Opinion of Powell, J.).
160. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
161. The four Justices who subscribed to the Stevens opinion and decided the case
on Title VI grounds did not reach this question.
162. See generally Sedler, supra note 139; Sedler, supra note 101.
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American life. The goals are that blacks, as well as whites,
will be significantly involved in governing society and share
positions of power and prestige, be meaningfully represented
in the American economic system, and not be disproportion-
ately lower-income in relation to whites. When these goals
are achieved, the consequences of the social history of racism
will no longer be so strikingly visible in American society.
The equal participation objective differs from "redressing
societal discrimination" in the sense that it is more focused
and looks both to the interest of blacks in achieving equal par-
ticipation in all important aspects of American life1 63 and to
the societal interest that is advanced by having such participa-
tion. 64 The equal participation objective has been discussed
in regard to specific aspects of American life, such as partici-
pation in the function of governance,' 65 in the "power profes-
sions," such as law and medicine, 166 and in the American
economic system. 167 The author places great emphasis on the
societal interest in the equal participation objective, and main-
tains that racial preference designed to advance that objective
should be upheld as constitutional.
The constitutional argument advanced in support of al-
lowing racial preference to achieve the equal participation ob-
jective is based on the implementation of constitutional values.
The equal participation objective is fully consistent with and
serves to implement the values embodied in the fourteenth
amendment and the Reconstruction amendments as a whole.
The broad, organic purpose of these amendments was to bring
about a condition of black freedom in the United States. In-
deed, these amendments embody the value of black freedom.
The black freedom value contains the promise of a racially
equal society, a society in which blacks would be full and equal
participants with whites, a racially equal society which has
not been realized in the United States because of the social
history of racism. The consequences of that history remain
163. This is the interest that is developed in Sedler, supra note 139.
164. This is the interest that is developed in Sedler, supra note 101.
165. Sedler, supra note 101, at 1248-50.
166. Id. at 1250-53.
167. Id. at 1253-57.
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and have created a condition of societal racial inequality in
which the black freedom value embodied in the fourteenth
amendment has not yet been realized. Since racial preference
designed to achieve the equal participation objective serves to
implement the constitutional value of black freedom, it is con-
tended that such preference in governmental programs and
operations should be held to be constitutional.1
68
The implementation of the constitutional value of black
freedom is also the constitutional argument that should be put
forth in support of the proposition that the constitutionally
appropriate standard to determine the validity of governmen-
tal action adversely affecting blacks should be racially dis-
criminatory effect rather than racially discriminatory intent.
In the concluding section of the article, the following demon-
strations will be made. First, the fourteenth amendment and
the other Reconstruction amendments embody the black free-
dom value. Second, the discriminatory intent standard, as
now applied by the Court, is not the appropriate constitu-
tional standard, because it upholds as constitutionally permis-
sible governmental action that perpetuates the present
consequences of the social history of racism and thus impairs
implementation of the black freedom value. Third, implemen-
tation of the black freedom value supports racially discrimina-
tory effect as the appropriate constitutional standard to
168. It cannot be disputed that racial preference for blacks designed to achieve the
equal participation objective causes racial detriment to affected whites. To this extent
racial preference is unfair. But because is it designed to achieve this very important
objective, it is not unjustifiable. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional law that
individuals may be required to make sacrifices in the public interest, and the public
interest may require that particular individual interests be preferred over other interests
and that particular individuals receive benefits at the expense of others. This principle is
no less applicable where the societal interest advanced by the giving of the preference is
a racial interest and the preference is a racial one. See generally id. at 1240-44. As
Chief Justice Burger stated in Fullilove: "It is not a constitutional defect in this pro-
gram that it may disappoint the expectations of nonminority firms. When effectuating a
limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such 'a
sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." 448 U.S. 448, 484
(1980). However, because any racial preference to blacks causes racial detriment to
adversely affected whites, strict scrutiny applies, and it must be shown both that the
racial preference is "justified by a compelling governmental interest," and that the par-
ticular means of preference are "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal."
Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846 (Opinion of Powell, J.).
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determine the validity of governmental action adversely affect-
ing blacks, and likewise supports the constitutional permissi-
bility of the affirmative use of racial preference by the
government in its programs and operations to advance the
equal participation objective.
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES, RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT, AND THE EQUAL
PARTICIPATION OBJECTIVE
While the protections of the fourteenth amendment are
universal and go beyond racial equality, 69 it cannot be
doubted that the primary concern of the framers of the four-
teenth amendment was with racial equality and the protection
of the newly emancipated blacks. 7° Looking to the historic
context in which the fourteenth amendment and the other Re-
construction amendments were promulgated, 1 7  and relating
the racial equality concern to the previous condition of slavery
and its consequences that the Reconstruction amendments
were designed to remedy, it may properly be said that the
broad, organic. purpose of these amendments was to bring
about a condition of black freedom in the United States. In
light of this broad, organic purpose, it is likewise proper to
conclude that the fourteenth amendment and the Reconstruc-
tion amendments, as a whole, embody the value of black
freedom.
A contemporaneous explication of the broad, organic
169. See Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An Assess-
ment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 129-30 (1983).
170. See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the
Laws", 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 132-42 (1950). As my colleague, Professor Joseph
Grano, has put it, the framers constitutionalized the value of racial equality into the
fourteenth amendment. Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Demo-
cratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 70-73 (1981).
171. The term "historic context" refers to the "principles and ideas which most
importantly influenced the development of [the] constitutional text." Saphire, Judicial
Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745, 780 (1983). Profes-
sor Saphire uses the term "historic context" in an effort to avoid the problems associ-
ated with ascertaining the "framers' intent," and notes that the reference to the
"historic context" of a constitutional provision is a reference to "foundational principles
and ideas [that] transcend the views expressed by particular persons." These principles
and ideas are "epochal," and "must be extrapolated, however imperfectly, from the
events of an entire political era." Id.
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purpose of the Reconstruction amendments is found in the
Slaughterhouse Cases.172 Although the main issue in that case
involved the meaning of the fourteenth amendment's privi-
leges and immunities clause, the Court emphasized that the
fourteenth amendment could not be read in isolation from the
other Reconstruction amendments. The Court reviewed the
circumstances leading to the adoption of each of these amend-
ments, and explained how, taken as a whole, they were
designed to deal with the consequences of slavery and the po-
sition of the newly-emancipated blacks in American society. 173
The Court stated the broad, organic purpose of the Re-
construction amendments in terms of a constitutional value of
black freedom:
We repeat then, in the light of this recapitulation of
events, almost too recent to be called history, but which
are familiar to us all; and on the most casual examination
of the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be
impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them
all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which
none of them would have been suggested; we mean the
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establish-
ment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
172. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
173. The Court began by observing that slavery was the "overshadowing and effi-
cient cause of the Civil War," and that at the end of the war in 1865, the thirteenth
amendment was put into the Constitution as "one of its most fundamental articles" to
implement "this main and most valuable result" of the war. Id. at 68. The Court re-
ferred to the thirteenth amendment as "this grand yet simple declaration of the personal
freedom of the human race within the jurisdiction of the government." Id. at 69. How-
ever, although slavery had been abolished, there was still massive discrimination against
the newly-emancipated blacks in the former slave states, so that "something more was
necessary in the way of constitutional protection to the unfortunate race who had suf-
fered so much." Id. at 70. It was to this end that the fourteenth amendment was
adopted in 1868. But even the adoption of the fourteenth amendment was "inadequate
for the protection of life, liberty and property, without which freedom to the slave was
no boon," because blacks were still being denied the suffrage. Thus, the trilogy of con-
stitutional protection for the newly-emancipated blacks was completed by the adoption
of the fifteenth amendment in 1870. As the Court concluded: "It is true that only the
fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the [N]egro by speaking of his color and his
slavery. But it is just as true that each of the other articles was addressed to the griev-
ances of that race and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth." Id. at 71-72.
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him. 174
Professor Arthur Kinoy has related the black freedom value
to the constitutional overturning of the premise of racial infer-
iority and subordination. As Kinoy states:
[T]he main thrust of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments was the construction of a penumbra
of legal commands which were designed to raise the race
of freedmen from the status of inferior beings-a status
imposed by the system of chattel slavery-to that of free
men and women, equal participants in the hitherto white
political community consisting of the 'people of the
United States.' The constitutional right of the black race
to this status of freedom was the simple and central objec-
tive of the Reconstruction Amendments.175
The significance of what Kinoy has called the constitutional
right of black freedom was recognized by the Supreme Court
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 176 There, the Court held that
Congress has the power, under the implementing clause of the
thirteenth amendment, to prohibit all racial discrimination by
private persons in the sale and rental of property.1 77
The Reconstruction amendments then embody the value
of black freedom. The broad, organic purpose of those
amendments was to establish a condition of black freedom in
the United States, to overturn forever the premise that blacks
were an inferior and subordinate group, and to make them
equal participants in the hitherto white-dominated American
society. The promise of the Reconstruction amendments was
174. Id. at 71.
175. Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 387,
388 (1967).
176. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
177. As the Court stated:
And when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their abil-
ity to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of
slavery.
.... At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure
under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a
white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live. If Con-
gress cannot say that being a free man means at least this much, then the
Thirteenth Amendment (has] made a promise the Nation cannot keep. Id. at
442-43.
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lost in the social history of racism, and has yet to be realized
in this Nation.
The author submits that the discriminatory intent re-
quirement, as now applied by the Court to determine whether
purportedly racially neutral governmental action amounts to
impermissible racial discrimination, is not the appropriate
constitutional standard. This is because the discriminatory in-
tent requirement permits the government to take action that
has the foreseeable effect of perpetuating the present conse-
quences of the social history of racism, and thus impairs im-
plementation of the black freedom value that is at the core of
the Reconstruction amendments. In Washington v. Davis,
Justice White stated, "the central purpose of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the preven-
tion of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.
17 8
Justice White explains that governmental action should not be
held unconstitutional solely on the ground that it has a ra-
cially disproportionate impact, in the sense that it affects pro-
portionately more blacks than whites. 17 9 Justice White never
explains, however, why an essential element of "official con-
duct discriminating on the basis of race," from a constitu-
tional standpoint, must be the existence of discriminatory
intent on the part of the governmental actor. Where the fore-
seeable consequences of governmental action is to create a ra-
cially discriminatory effect, as the author has defined the
concept,,8 0 it would seem that there has been "official conduct
discriminating on the basis of race," regardless of whether this
effect was specifically "intended" by the governmental actor.
The Court's imposition of a "discriminatory intent" re-
quirement as an essential element of an equal protection viola-
tion is not consistent with the approach that the Court has
taken with respect to the violation of other constitutional
guarantees. Professor Binion maintains:
No other guarantee of the Constitution is subjected to the
necessity of proof that the violations alleged were by gov-
ernmental design. To the contrary, the violation of any
178. 426 U.S. at 239.
179. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
SOCIAL HISTORY OF RACISM
other constitutionally protected right is demonstrated by
evidence that the law or practice challenged infringes
upon the right in question. It is always sufficient to chal-
lenge what the law does, its substance, and its conse-
quences for constitutionally protected rights. 8 '
In the establishment clause area, for example, even though a
governmental action advances a valid secular purpose and is
not "intended" to benefit religion, the establishment clause is
violated when the action has such a "beneficial effect." The
Court here specifically refers to the "effects test,", 8 2 and as it
observed in School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball:
"[B]ut our cases have consistently recognized that even such a
praiseworthy, secular purpose [remedial and enrichment edu-
cation of children attending parochial schools] cannot validate
government aid to parochial schools when the aid has the ef-
fect of promoting a single religion or religion generally or
when the aid unduly entangles the government in matters
religious."'1 83
The "discriminatory intent" requirement necessary to es-
tablish an equal protection violation also contrasts sharply
with the Court's view of what constitutes "discrimination" for
negative commerce clause purposes. The Court has long held
that the focus here is entirely on discriminatory effect. In
practice, the Court has always invalidated state regulations
having the essential effect of discriminating against or dis-
advantaging interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in
favor of local commerce or in-state interests because of the
interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature
of those interests. 1 84 As the Court observed in Philadelphia v.
New Jersey: "Whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may
181. Binion, supra note 87, at 416. Professor Binion illustrates this point by a con-
sideration of the first amendment and of the provisions of the fourth through eighth
amendments protecting the rights of persons accused of crime. Id. at 430.
182. The standard for determining an establishment clause violation has been stated
with reference to a three-part test: (1) The governmental action must have a secular
legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and (3) it must not foster an "excessive governmental entangle-
ment with religion." If any one of these elements is not satisfied, the establishment
clause has been violated. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
183. - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3222 (1985).
184. See Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regula-
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not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of com-
merce coming from outside the State unless there is some rea-
son, apart from their origin, to treat them differently."' 85 The
complete irrelevancy of "intent" to the existence of a constitu-
tional violation in this area was long ago stated by the Court
in Minnesota v. Barber,186 where it invalidated a Minnesota
law requiring fresh meat to have been inspected by a Minne-
sota inspector within 24 hours of slaughter, because the prac-
tical effect of the law was to prevent the sale in Minnesota of
meat slaughtered in other states:
The presumption that this statute was enacted, in good
faith, for the purpose expressed in the title, namely to pro-
tect the health of the people of Minnesota, cannot control
the final determination of the question whether it is not
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. There
may be no purpose on the part of a Legislature to violate
the provisions of that instrument, and yet a statute en-
acted by it, under the forms of law, may, by its necessary
operation, be destructive of rights granted or secured by
the Constitution. In such cases, the courts must sustain
the supreme law of the land by declaring the statute un-
constitutional and void.' 87
Neither in Washington v. Davis nor in any other case has the
Court explained precisely why a showing of "discriminatory
intent" is an essential element of an equal protection violation
when it does not appear to be so with respect to any other
constitutional guarantee.
More significantly, the "discriminatory intent" require-
ment, as applied to claims of racial discrimination so as to
uphold the constitutionality of governmental action having a
foreseeable racially discriminatory effect, impairs the imple-
mentation of the black freedom value embodied in the
fourteenth amendment and the other Reconstruction amend-
ments. Any governmental action having such an effect per-
petuates the consequences of the social history of racism and
tion and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L.
REV. 885, 898-906 (1985).
185. 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
186. 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
187. Id. at 319.
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aggravates the condition of societal racial inequality and racial
separation that is inconsistent with realization of the black
freedom value. Under the approach advocated, such an ac-
tion would be subject to a strong burden of justification before
it could be sustained as constitutional. This approach to de-
termining the constitutionality of governmental action having
a foreseeable racially discriminatory effect is fully consistent
with and serves to implement the constitutional value of black
freedom. The Court's present approach, focusing on the exist-
ence of "discriminatory intent" on the part of the governmen-
tal actor, is inconsistent with and impairs the implementation
of that value, and for this reason is not the appropriate ap-
proach for the Court to follow.
Likewise, the equal participation objective, which the au-
thor has set forth as the justification for the constitutionally
permissible use of racial preference benefiting blacks in gov-
ernmental programs and operations, is fully consistent with
and serves to implement the black freedom value. The equal
participation objective is related to achieving a racially equal
society, a society in which blacks would be full and equal par-
ticipants in all important aspects of American life, a society in
which black freedom would truly become a reality. In Bakke,
Justice Marshall emphasized the equal participation objective
and related it to overcoming the present consequences of the
social history of racism. As he stated:
In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its dev-
astating impact on the lives of Negroes, bringing the Ne-
gro into the mainstream of American life should be a state
interest of the highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure
that America will forever remain a divided society. ...
It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we
now must permit the institutions of this society to give
consideration to race in making decisions about who will
hold the positions of influence, affluence and prestige in
America. ]For far too long, the doors to those positions
have been shut to Negroes. If we are ever to become a
fully integrated society, one in which the color of a per-
son's skin will not determine the opportunities available to
him or her, we must be willing to take steps to open those
doors. I do not believe that anyone can truly look into
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America's past and still find that a remedy for the effects
of that past is impermissible. 8 '
It is the author's submission, therefore, that the use of racial
preference benefiting blacks in governmental programs and
operations, designed to advance the equal participation objec-
tive, is fully consistent with and serves to implement the con-
stitutional value of black freedom and so should be upheld as
constitutional. 189
CONCLUSION
In this writing, the author has set forth his views as to
how the Constitution should be interpreted to deal with the
present consequences of the social history of racism in this
Nation that have created a condition of societal racial inequal-
ity. This constitutional position is based on the implementa-
tion of the black freedom value that is embodied in the
fourteenth amendment and the Reconstruction amendments
as a whole. It is submitted that, in light of the black freedom
value, the Constitution both requires and permits the govern-
ment to take account of these consequences. The author has
defined the concept of racially discriminatory effect, as dis-
tinct from racially disproportionate impact, and has main-
tained that whenever governmental action has a foreseeable
racially discriminatory effect, such action should be held un-
constitutional unless supported by strong justification. Like-
wise, it is the author's position that the use of racial preference
benefiting blacks in governmental programs and operations
should be held to be constitutional whenever it is related to
bringing about the full and equal participation of blacks in all
important aspects of American life. These propositions have
not yet been recognized by the Court, and to this extent the
Court's current constitutional doctrine stands as an obstacle
188. 438 U.S. at 396, 401-02 (Marshall, J., concurring).
189. Under the Court's current doctrine the use of racial preference for this purpose
should be held to advance a "compelling" governmental interest. It is a separate ques-
tion, of course, whether the particular means used are "precisely tailored to the ad-
vancement of that goal." See supra note 168.
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to achieving what Justice Marshall has called "genuine equal-
ity" between blacks and whites in American society.190
190. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 398 (Marshall, J. concurring).
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